
Li Lu
Key Views & Dialogues
36th Annual Graham & Dodd Event with Li Lu ‘96, Founder and Chairman of Himalaya Capital
Li Lu defines wealth as ownership of global purchasing power, built by holding great businesses bought at advantageous prices while they create value over time. He warns that AI’s recurring costs and capital needs persist, and argues humans must remain in control; concentration around market leaders may meanwhile leave overlooked businesses attractively priced. In China, semiconductor restrictions have helped domestic producers improve, while falling home prices have sharply weakened household wealth and demand; Li expects equities eventually to play a larger role, with timing uncertain.
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- Li Lu defines wealth as ownership of global purchasing power, accumulated through businesses that create value over time. His framework combines Graham’s business ownership, market independence, and margin of safety with Buffett’s circle of competence and Munger’s advice to “fish where the fish are.” Himalaya’s implementation is to buy great businesses in dynamic economies at advantageous prices and hold long enough to participate in their value creation.
- AI’s usefulness does not remove its recurring costs, capital requirements, or need for human judgment. Li calls the technology “transformative, dangerous, disruptive, and costly” and rejects investment narratives culminating in an “IPO of a God.” He advocates keeping humans in the loop, particularly during recursive self-improvement. Santos suggests that skilled people checking AI output will capture scarce economic rents; Li broadly agrees, while emphasizing nuances.
- Market concentration can create opportunities among businesses overlooked by investors chasing the leaders. Santos puts Nvidia’s capitalization at about 15% of GDP, versus a historical 2–4% range for the largest company. Li contrasts roughly 14–15% annual S&P returns over 16 years since 2010 with approximately zero during 2000–2010: combined, the result returns to high single digits. His conclusion is that widening speculative enthusiasm can improve the opportunity set for investors who remain rational.
- China’s industrial upgrade has coincided with a severe contraction in household wealth and confidence. Li says typical middle-class families had 70% of net worth tied to homes carrying roughly 50% mortgage leverage; a subsequent nationwide property-price decline of about 40% reduced family wealth by 60–70%. Households consequently consume less, save more, and repay debt. He puts saving deposits at RMB165 trillion, about 120% of GDP, while domestic-demand growth has slowed to roughly zero.
- Li’s central question for investing in China is whether a business is a state objective or the cost of achieving one. “Being the cost of a state objective is no fun.” He argues semiconductor restrictions supplied domestic producers with the orders needed to fund improvement, while manufacturing advanced toward the higher end. He expects equities eventually to assume a greater role in household wealth as property’s share declines, but leaves the timing open.
- Li expects commercial interdependence to outlast the geopolitical order currently being reshaped. Leaving the common market sacrifices efficiency, specialization, and access to trading partners, while barriers redirect commerce through third countries. Semiconductor supply chains illustrate the dependence underpinning what he calls “strategic stability.” Countries can compete intensely while sharing an interest in preserving that stability.
- A value strategy requires patient partners and a temperament capable of surviving underperformance. Li warns that demanding good results every year, quarter, or month can turn an investor into a speculator. Downside protection starts with understanding the boundaries of one’s knowledge and expanding them gradually. His rule for compounding—“you don’t lose what you already have”—extends beyond capital to knowledge, relationships, wisdom, and health.
Li Lu: Global Value Investing in Our Era (2024-12-07) | 李录’s Lecture at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, “Global Value Investing and the Era” (December 7, 2024)
Li Lu frames China’s strain as a post-takeoff “Stage 2.5,” with consumption near 40% of GDP and savings near 50%. The key mechanism is converting savings into consumption, risk capital and credit, with Hong Kong’s rule of law, dispute resolution and international trust underused. His margin-of-safety discipline favors understandable compounders that can withstand volatility without debt.
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李录把中国当前的困境定义为工业起飞后的“2.5阶段”,而不是中国独有的终局性危机。 Youth unemployment among 16–24-year-olds is around 20%; 80%–90% of jobs are provided by the non-state sector and individuals, while real estate still accounts for about 60% of household wealth. Supply-side policy cannot solve a contraction in demand, leaving consumer confidence, private-sector confidence and official incentives weakening at the same time; “involution” is extreme competition in a deflationary environment.
中国能否跨越中等收入阶段,最关键的经济指标不是一次刺激的力度,而是个人消费占GDP的比例能否从约40%持续上升。 The savings rate has risen from 40% to around 50%, leaving a large pool of capital trapped in the state banking system. India’s consumption share is around 60% and the US exceeds 70%. Li Lu therefore treats “spontaneous, organic and sustainable economic growth” as the KPI of modernization, with consumers, entrepreneurs, officials, foreign capital and international relations all potentially serving as the “chicken that lays the egg” that can ignite the entire chain.
现代资本市场的核心产物不是资金,而是信用;香港则是中国已经拥有、却尚未充分利用的制度资产。 From Venice and the Netherlands to Britain after 1688, financial systems pooled small savings from ordinary people into long-term productive capital. Hong Kong combines the law, dispute-resolution mechanisms, professional intermediaries and international trust required for this role, but “credit takes a very long time to build and can be broken in a very short time”; if its independence continues to erode, the consequences are incalculable.
许多政策困惑源于农业文明留下的静态观念与现代经济复利增长之间的错位。 Land once determined the space available for survival; today, market scale and the circulation of technology, labor and capital matter more. The distinction between the “real” and “virtual” economies has also lost meaning: roughly 1M–2M combat drones on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield are operated by gamers, while Nvidia has not produced a single wafer in 31 years yet has become infrastructure for gaming, cloud computing and AI.
价值投资真正守护的不是现金、土地或某个静态数字,而是投资者在其消费经济体中的购买力占比。 “Macroeconomics is what we must accept; microeconomics is where we can act.” Global investors should own the most creative companies in the most dynamic economies, while individuals should preserve their purchasing power where they actually consume; short-term macro volatility should not replace judgment about specific businesses.
价值投资并非只能在稳定年代奏效,它恰恰诞生并成熟于大萧条、战争和金融危机。 Graham lost 70% from 1929 to 1932, Keynes managed the King’s College fund from the front line of wartime Britain, and Templeton bought every US stock trading below $1 in 1939. During the Asian financial crisis that Li Lu experienced, most markets fell more than 70% and the worst fell more than 90%, yet “gold was everywhere.”
真正稀缺的不是发现短期低估,而是理解并守住能够长期复利的“圣杯”公司。 Li Lu held BYD for 22 years; the stock fell more than 50% at least 7 or 8 times and 80% once, while revenue rose from RMB1B to nearly RMB1T. He sold mainly after finding an error, a better opportunity, an extreme bubble or facing redemptions, while avoiding debt allowed him to withstand a 50% drawdown in the portfolio.
六条原则最终汇成同一个动作:在能力圈内,到“有鱼而且人少”的地方,以安全边际买入企业所有权并长期学习。 Mr. Market provides a service, not guidance. Value investors use price discovery to connect savings with the most productive companies rather than extract zero-sum gains from counterparties. “Investing is like fishing: first, fish where there are fish; second, never forget the first rule.”