Topics Pioneers Insight Method Author
Back to Pioneers
陈冕
Entrepreneurs 2 Curated Dialogues

陈冕

Lovart·Founder & CEO

Rendering the long image…

Frontier Insights

Thesis: General foundation models cannot cannibalize deep verticals; using frontier models (e.g., Claude/MCP), AI must orchestrate end-to-end design workflows, while next-gen video (Sora) will unlock multi-billion-user AI-native social ecosystems via remixing.

Strategy: Move hyper-fast (3–4 month execution cycles), embrace thin margins (0–30%) without subsidizing traffic, scale context/workflow moats, and prioritize cash flow over vanity spend.

Risks: Rapidly inflating CAC (3–4 to ~20 RMB), annual prepayment-masked cash flow health, steep inference costs, 3–6 month competitive windows, and existential platform/regulatory dependency.

Key Views & Dialogues

136: Sora’s New World & Lovart’s 4-Month Review | Talking with 陈冕 About Building a Vertical Agent | Agent #5

晚点聊 LateTalk

Sora turns nine-second generation into an AI social product through Cameo co-creation and Remix, linking friends, celebrities, and relationship networks. If virtual social has a 10%–20% chance of becoming a Super App, giants may have only a three-to-six-month follow-up window. Lovart reached 150K–200K DAU two months after launch and exceeded $30M in estimated full-year revenue, while early losses, privacy regulation, generation costs, and rapid replication remain risks.

View summary (7)
  • 陈冕’s core read on the Sora App is not “AI TikTok,” but an AI social product powered by Cameo. A nine-second video can now deliver shot language, Chinese voice, character consistency and audio-visual sync in one pass, but the real product flywheel comes from “shooting with friends and celebrities” and Remix via left-right swipes. His Aha moment was: “Isn’t this social? Wow, this is Instagram.”

  • Sora may be opening a virtual-social opportunity serving billions of users, while compressing the competitive window to three to six months. 陈冕 believes that if there is even a 10%–20% chance it becomes a Super App, model leaders and companies that already own Super Apps cannot afford to sit out. But even a mid-sized startup that gets there first would face facial-privacy, regulatory and enormous generation-cost pressures, followed by rapid replication from the giants; opportunity and capital are more likely to concentrate at the top.

  • Two months after its public launch, Lovart’s DAU had reached 150K–200K. During Beta, daily activity was roughly 10K–20K under invite-only access, although the original source does not specify the exact metric; after Beta, DAU first rose to 80K–100K, with Nano Banana driving another step-up. The US accounts for more than one-third of users, with a slightly higher but not dramatically higher share of revenue; on a full-year estimated-revenue basis, revenue has exceeded $30M. Usage costs are currently broadly covered, but the higher free-user mix and conversion lag mean the business will still lose money overall in its early phase.

  • Lovart’s vertical moat is not exclusive access to a foundation model, but a proprietary Interface, Context and industry experience. Chat Canvas simulates a client and designer pointing at visual work together around a table, while the product plans to accumulate enterprise historical assets, Reference and Preference; when every application can call similar models, “whoever collects more Context will deliver the better experience.”

  • 陈冕 summarizes AI application growth as drawing the product that should exist after models mature, then waiting for the technology wave to catch up. Once models such as GPT Image 1 and Nano Banana delivered on complex instructions, editing and consistency, the pre-built Chat Canvas could amplify those capabilities immediately; the next phase is to grow the early Agent user base, deepen Context Engineering, and keep making the trade-off between waiting for models and filling today’s gaps with engineering.

  • Productivity applications have entered a knife-fight, and 陈冕 believes new entrants must “already be at the table this year,” while the next major opportunity is To C. Veo 3 once cut prices by 70%, Nano Banana is cheaper than GPT Image 1, and GPT-5 is cheaper than Claude; as creation costs continue to fall, the variable will shift from “who produces content” to “what new content people consume.” But startup To C Super Apps are more likely to grow gradually from an overlooked corner than explode at launch.

  • Speed is both Lovart’s organizational advantage and its most visible operating risk. 陈冕 believes an AI product’s effective window may last only two years, so the team prioritizes people who understand AI, learn at high frequency and accept constant adjustment. The pace is grounded not in blind optimism, but in two still-testable beliefs—that AI will continue to improve rapidly and that AI will replace fictional-content creation—along with a contradictory warning to himself: “I’m a little afraid I’m too anxious, and I’m also afraid I’m not anxious enough.”

Read the deep dive →

Listen to full conversation →

103. Lovart Founder 陈冕 Looks Back on Two Years of Building an App: This Moment Feels So Damn Good!! Hahahahahaha

张小珺Jùn|商业访谈录

Lovart is betting that general-purpose models will not subsume verticals within five years, while Claude 3.5’s Agentic capability let AI plan workflows for designers and compress the path from concept to execution. Its viral launch drove the waitlist to 120K, but acquisition cost rose from RMB3–4 to about RMB20 per user; with early-2025 ARR near or above $10M and valuation at a few hundred million dollars, conversion and profitability remain key tests.

View summary (7)
  • The core investment thesis: general-purpose models will not subsume verticals. 陈冕’s bet is that vertical data, interfaces, and use cases differ too widely; general-purpose agent entry points will converge around a few winner-take-all players, while vertical agents will proliferate, both called by general-purpose systems and accessed directly by users with their own mindshare. The implicit assumption is that “AGI will not arrive within five years—if AGI arrives tomorrow, quit; we’ll all be working for AI.”
  • The full numerical chain from despair to reversal unfolded within a year. In 2023, the first round raised $4M at an $18M valuation (“we priced it too low; we should have asked for $50M”); a subsidy war burned through roughly $3M; the product was taken offline in September for lacking a large-model filing; cash at one point fell to RMB4K, and “nobody wanted it even at a $30M valuation.” In 2024, 2–3 months after the license returned, the company closed three rounds totaling over $20M. By early 2025, ARR was close to, and even above, $10M; the current valuation is “probably a few hundred million dollars.”
  • Claude 3.5 unlocked Lovart’s product. The original plan was to have designers build workflow nodes on a canvas, but “designers don’t speak logic; designers speak in feelings.” In December 2024, after discovering the model’s stronger Agentic capabilities plus MCP, the team shifted to having AI plan workflows for designers, causing the barrier to entry to collapse; it took only 3–4 months from idea to execution. Manis’s lesson was that “people only remember the first”: leave general-purpose to Manis; “the true first vertical was Cursor—we want to build the Cursor of creation.”
  • The viral breakout proved that timing determines customer-acquisition cost. A post published at midnight drew 800K views overnight, Elon Musk liked it, and the waitlist reached 120K. Customer acquisition for the first-generation product cost just RMB3–4 per person; today it is around RMB20. “The core of product-market fit comes from timing, and timing comes from breakthrough innovation”—miss the window and paid acquisition becomes a bottomless pit; “you can never beat the big platforms.”
  • His decade in mobile internet became a library of failure cases. Mobike’s 40–50M rides were sustained by unlimited supply and ignoring supply costs; once it had to break even, “it might do only a few million orders a day,” making it “maybe acceptable as a cost center in a payment war, but unacceptable as a business in its own right.” Daily Fresh showed that “internet plus retail is a fake proposition.” The conclusion: “business model determines almost everything”; since then, he has only pursued pure-online, high-gross-margin businesses with scale effects.
  • The business model will move from subscriptions to paying by deliverable. In the short term, professional designers will use subscriptions; in the long term, if production relations change and clients use AI directly, “AI will calculate the tokens and electricity it expects to consume, then quote you a price.” To B “absolutely will not happen in the short term” because it is not the organization’s strength. The end state is “1–2 relative winner-take-most players,” while major ecosystems will still retain their own products, as Adobe coexists with Final Cut and 剪映.
  • AI has already deconstructed the organization. Product managers “no longer exist”; the core jobs are teaching AI industry knowledge and coding. His advice to founders: build vertical products, not general-purpose ones; “don’t believe in product managers”; prepare before model intelligence improves—and “the most important thing about getting out there is getting out there.”

Read the deep dive →

Listen to full conversation →