Yet Another Value's 2025 Idea of the Year: Full House Resorts $FLL

Summary

• Andrew Walker’s 2025 “idea of the year” is Full House Resorts ($FLL), a $150M market cap / $600M EV micro-cap he’s long in significant size. The upside framework is the CEO’s own math from the Q4 2021 call: ~$200M of ramped EBITDA at a 10x precedent multiple = $2B, less ~$650M of debt, over 37M shares — “something north of $30 per share” against a stock now around $4.
• The whole pitch is built on a case study: Monarch Casino ($MCRI) made a bet-the-company ~$400M expansion of its Black Hawk, Colorado property in 2014 when the entire market looked “sold out” at roughly $550M of gaming revenue. The market instead expanded to approximately $850M by fiscal 2024, almost all driven by Monarch, whose share went from ~10% to ~30% and whose stock Walker described as up approximately 5.5 times — roughly 3–4 times the Russell 2000. Walker’s claim: “Full House Resorts will be Monarch 2.0.”
• The mechanism is quality-starved demand, per the FLL CEO’s Q3 2023 framing: find an underpenetrated gaming market “without a differentiated product” and build one. Colorado Springs generated under $150 of gaming revenue per capita versus a ~$200 national average; Chicagoland does roughly $200 versus Detroit at $383 and St. Louis at $364 despite being larger and wealthier — “if that doesn’t scream ‘underpenetrated gaming market,’ I don’t know what does.”
• The two trophy assets are Chamonix, a $250M French luxury build in Cripple Creek opened December 27, 2023, and American Place, an hour north of Chicago, for which the company has cited potential EBITDA of $50M and $100M respectively. Walker considers American Place’s ramp established: the temporary tent is already running in the mid-$30Ms of EBITDA and he expects it above $40M within 12 months. Hard Rock Rockford’s permanent build immediately doubled temporary revenue, with projections of 3x — “there is no way if they’re doing 40 million in EBITDA in a tent” the permanent facility won’t generate at least $80M.
• The opportunity exists because FLL “screens absolutely terribly”: a $30M loss over nine months, ~$45–50M of annualized interest expense, and roughly $325M of permanent-casino capex still hanging over a levered small cap. Walker points to Bally’s ~$2B sale-leaseback at a low-8% cap rate — with GLPI funding approximately $1.2B through the transaction — as a precedent supporting his view that FLL could finance the remaining build and that its property value could cover its entire enterprise value.
• The biggest tail risk is the Forest County Potawatomi tribe’s lawsuit over the American Place license, which Walker views as a likely delay tactic by a competing casino roughly 50 minutes away. The federal suit was already dismissed (“no reasonable jury could find” the tribe similarly situated); the state case is at the Supreme Court on standing. Walker estimates roughly 70/30 that the tribe has standing but argues the underlying challenge should ultimately fail — a $25,000 application fee versus $175M already invested.
• M&A optionality is the kicker he explicitly excludes from his math: Churchill Downs paid 10.2x for Peninsula Pacific Entertainment in 2022 with year-three ramp and synergy considerations, and Eldorado/Caesars projected $500M of synergies and later reported more than $1B realized within a year. A strategic buyer could remove public-company, management, technology and other costs, so “10x on fully ramped Chamonix/American Place earnings” is framed as conservative — with none of those synergies included in the $30 target.

Deep dive

1. A solo pitch, a real position, and a Monarch thought experiment

• This is a format experiment: a screen-shared deck built entirely from public filings, company presentations and state-regulator data (“I did not put a single image together for this presentation”), presenting the Yet Another Value Podcast 2025 idea of the year. Walker is long FLL in significant size and stresses the extra risk and liquidity risk of a smaller-cap name.
• Instead of opening with FLL, he runs a role-play: it is 2014, he is CEO of Monarch Casino & Resort (ticker MCRI), a $300M EV company doing nearly $50M of EBITDA — Atlantis in Reno at $30–35M, and the Black Hawk casino acquired in April 2012 at $15–16M — proposing to the audience-as-board a $300–400M expansion of the Black Hawk property. “This is a bet-the-company bet.”
• The board’s rational objection: total Black Hawk gaming revenue had been essentially flat around $550M for a decade (2006: $550M; 2014: $560M), and Monarch had roughly 10% share. Underwriting $300M of capex means underwriting roughly $200M of incremental revenue — nearly 50% market share — while other casinos could respond with a promotional war. “There’s really no way we can underwrite 50% market share.”

2. Why Colorado is probably the best state for domestic casino development

• An aside worth the detour: Black Hawk’s 2008 revenue drop was not the financial crisis. Regional casinos were only down low single digits nationally in 2008 — Vegas takes the recession hit while “bread-and-butter” weekend players trade down to regionals. The real culprit was Colorado’s 2008 casino smoking ban, which Walker says can cut revenue 10–15% almost immediately.
• The two major risks for a regional casino are a competitor opening within driving distance and a smoking ban. Colorado’s constitution bans gambling except in three former mining towns — Black Hawk and Central City, roughly an hour from Denver, and Cripple Creek, roughly an hour from Colorado Springs — and it is about a five-hour drive to another state. Contrast Oklahoma, where 16 casinos sit along the Texas border because Dallas-area customers can drive 60–90 minutes to gamble. “If we open a casino and it’s an incredible success, there’s not going to be a competitive response.”
• The product-quality argument: the early-1990s legalization produced casinos matching the dying mining towns — places to “chain-smoke, play penny slots and drink six beers in a day.” Denver was not under-gambling because Denverites do not gamble; Walker’s argument is that they were underserved by a quality product. Build luxury and “if you build it, they will come.”

3. Monarch made the bet and the market — not just the casino — expanded

• The supporting case within the case: Monarch Black Hawk decided in 2014 to spend approximately $400M expanding the property. The investment was roughly $400–430M and produced about $60M of EBITDA by 2022. Walker does not call it a screaming home run, but sees it as evidence of what a quality build could do in Black Hawk.
• The outcome, straight from state data: Black Hawk gaming revenue went from approximately $550M in fiscal 2014 to $850M in fiscal 2024 while Central City ($70M→$80M) and Cripple Creek ($130M→$170M) grew roughly with inflation — “almost all of that explosion” was driven by Monarch Black Hawk’s growth, whose share rose from roughly 10% to roughly 30%.
• The stock followed: Walker described it as up approximately 5.5 times over ten years, versus approximately 120% for the Russell 2000, through a difficult stretch for gaming and small-cap stocks — “a crazy home run.”

4. Full House in one slide: six casinos, two that matter

• FLL is a $150M market cap, $600M EV micro-cap, down from a $400M market cap at one point after a brutal period for value stocks. Of six casinos, Silver Slipper in Mississippi alone is “probably worth $150 million” — perhaps $120M or $180M — and holds personal significance as Walker’s mother’s and grandmother’s favorite place, where his 86-year-old grandmother broke her hip, with no fault on Silver Slipper’s part.
• The equity story lives in two assets: Chamonix, a $250M French luxury resort in Cripple Creek opened December 27, 2023, and American Place, an hour north of Chicago. Chamonix had a soft opening; the grand opening, attended by Jay Leno, came in late October or early November 2024. Walker presents it as an effort to copy the Black Hawk playbook — a quality, weekend-destination product in a market previously dominated by places such as the Brass Ass and its restaurant, Dynamite Dick’s.
• The underpenetration math for Chamonix: national gaming revenue per capita was approximately $200 in 2019 (~$65B revenue / 323M people), while Colorado Springs was under $150 ($133M gaming revenue, roughly 1M people), and Denver was at approximately $174 despite having Black Hawk an hour away. Walker argues that these markets were underserved by a quality product, not lacking in demand.

5. American Place: the most valuable asset, in a tent

• Chicagoland looks well-served — Bally’s downtown project, Rivers Casino 30–45 minutes south, and the Forest County Potawatomi casino across the Wisconsin border — but per-capita gaming revenue is only roughly $200 versus Detroit at $383, St. Louis at $364, Baltimore at $326, and Kansas City at $349, in a market larger and wealthier than those comparables. “If that doesn’t scream ‘underpenetrated gaming market,’ I don’t know what does.”
• FLL won the license in 2021 and opened the temporary facility — “it’s a tent… with a bunch of slot machines in it” — in February 2023. The permanent facility is expected to cost approximately $500M in total, but construction has not begun while the lawsuit proceeds. The tent generated roughly $30M of LTM EBITDA, is now in the mid-$30Ms by Walker’s estimate, and he expects it to exceed a $40M run rate within 12 months.
• The permanent facility’s $100M EBITDA target is the company’s estimate, not Walker’s standalone number. The tent has fewer than 1,000 slot machines, a restaurant and steakhouse, but lacks many of the permanent property’s restaurants, entertainment venues and spa; the permanent casino is expected to have 1,500–1,600 machines. “There is no way if they’re doing 40 million in EBITDA in a tent they won’t be doing 80 million” in the permanent facility, which Walker calls conservative.

6. Why the opportunity exists: the stock screens horrifically

• His standard opening question, asked of himself: the Q3 2024 income statement shows a $30M loss over nine months, against roughly $50M of run-rate EBITDA and approximately $45–50M of annualized interest expense. Chamonix’s $250M of debt-financed capex is not yet fully reflected in the trailing numbers, and the property is roughly at break-even; American Place is still operating in a tent. On screeners and value metrics, “this screens absolutely terribly… just horrifically.”
• There is also impatience: people got excited about the story, then after Chamonix opened in December 2023 and January 2024 arrived, asked why it was not already a $50M EBITDA property. Walker identifies three concerns — financing the $325M temporary-to-permanent build, the Potawatomi lawsuit, and ramp-up risk — and addresses each in turn.

7. Ramp risk: settled at American Place, tracking at Chamonix — with one donkey-shaped illustration

• The Rockford comparable does the heavy lifting: Hard Rock Casino Rockford’s temporary facility generated approximately $6M per month of revenue; the permanent casino opened in August or September 2024 and immediately generated approximately $14M per month. October and November data also showed revenue had doubled, while projections for the permanent operation were three times the temporary facility’s revenue. Walker expects further growth as it seasons; he notes that full seasoning generally takes about three years.
• Chamonix’s own ramp: Bronco Billy’s generated approximately $1.5M per month before Chamonix opened; Chamonix went from the high-$2Ms per month in January to above $3M by April and the mid-$4Ms over the summer. “Would I like it to be faster and stronger? Sure” — but it is ramping, which is why he is pitching now rather than before the operating data existed: “I’ve got the data.”
• His one non-public-domain slide is a photo of a donkey he followed for two blocks after visiting Chamonix in early August — his illustration of the real Cripple Creek risks: the town is tiny, staffing may require hour-long commutes, and it is more out of the way than Black Hawk. His answer: “every risk that I described basically applies to Black Hawk too, and Black Hawk was a screaming success.”

8. The Potawatomi lawsuit: a competitor’s sand-in-the-gears play, in Walker’s view

• The stakes are existential — “American Place alone would cover the entire enterprise value of the company” if and when it is built — because the tribe’s suit has delayed the permanent build, which was originally expected to start in 2023. Walker thinks the tribe’s casino, approximately 50 minutes away, has an incentive to delay American Place because each month avoids losing customers and could preserve another $1M, $2M or $5M of earnings. He views the case as a delay tactic rather than a merits case, while acknowledging he could be wrong.
• The federal case is already dismissed, with the judge writing that “no reasonable jury could find” the tribe similarly situated to the other applicants and that there were sufficient rational bases for the city’s decision not to certify the plaintiff. The state case was initially dismissed on summary judgment, reinstated on appeal, and is now at the state Supreme Court. Walker believes the court heard from the state and city in September and expects a ruling sometime in January.
• The immediate Supreme Court issue is only whether the tribe has standing to sue to block the project. Walker estimates roughly 70/30 that the tribe has standing, but argues the underlying challenge should fail. The equitable-remedies argument is that the tribe paid a $25,000 application fee and was rejected, while FLL has already invested $175M, including a $50M gaming license, with hundreds of jobs and millions in tax revenue at stake. Walker argues that failing to check one or two boxes should not delay hundreds of millions of dollars already invested.
• Walker also argues that the anti-graft and procurement provisions cited by the tribe are more suited to lowest-bidder commodity contracts than to a multi-factor casino proposal involving a hotel, restaurants, entertainment and other amenities. The tribe says the process was flawed; the city and other parties argue that the relevant provisions do not apply in that manner and that the license was awarded after considering multiple factors.

9. Financing the $325M: the propco alone may be worth the whole EV

• The market’s number-one fear is funding the tent-to-permanent conversion. FLL has roughly $450–500M of debt and approximately $50M of EBITDA, with debt expected to reach about $650M once American Place is fully operational. The CEO and CFO, both significant shareholders, have said the project is financeable, that they have multiple options, and that they will not use equity to finance it this year.
• The proof point is Bally’s sale-leaseback of just under $2B at a low-8% cap rate with approximately 2–2.2x rent coverage. The transaction included the downtown Chicago property, with GLPI funding approximately $1.2B through the sale-leaseback against roughly $1.8B of construction needs. Walker views Bally’s as more levered and, in his opinion, generally lower quality than Chamonix and American Place.
• Applied to FLL’s wholly owned real estate, an opco/propco split at those cap rates could allow a sale-leaseback to finance the remaining construction. Once the properties are fully ramped, Walker believes the property value could cover more than all of FLL’s enterprise value, leaving the operating properties effectively free.
• The caveat is that the real estate is only as valuable as the operating earnings underneath it. If Chamonix generates $15M rather than $50M of EBITDA, or American Place $50M rather than $100M, the valuation case is weaker. Golden Entertainment’s Q3 2024 presentation provides a comparable framework: it valued its property company at a low-end 12.5x multiple, roughly an 8% cap rate, and a 13.5x base case.

10. The upside math, and the M&A kicker he is not counting

• The anchor is the CEO’s Q4 2021 framework: approximately $50M from Chamonix, $100M from fully operational American Place, and roughly $50M from the other casinos plus online licenses, for approximately $200M of EBITDA; 10x equals $2B; less approximately $650M of debt leaves $1.35B over 37M shares — “north of $30 per share.” The CEO called that a quadrupling when the stock was $7–8; Walker notes that the stock is now around $4.
• The 10x is supported by precedents: Churchill Downs paid 10.2x EBITDA for Peninsula Pacific Entertainment in 2022, giving credit for new locations reaching a year-three full ramp and for corporate synergies; Golden’s Rocky Gap transaction generated approximately a 10x EBITDA multiple in an opco/propco split, with the operating company sold to Century Casinos and the property to VICI; and Walker believes FLL’s Stockman’s sale generated a low-teens multiple.
• Synergies are the free option. In the Eldorado/Caesars combination, management projected $500M of synergies and later said more than $1B had been realized within a year. Caesars also cited examples including Tropicana, which was producing $33M at acquisition while management said it could produce $40M through synergies and had generated $72M in the prior year, and a Tunica property that rose from $65M to more than $100M of EBITDA under new ownership.
• A strategic buyer could remove public-company costs, separate CEO and CFO costs, player-management systems, technology spending, marketing and other overhead. Walker thinks the synergies could be substantial, but “I have factored none of that into the math.” He concludes that the core case — Chamonix and American Place ramping, approximately $200M of EBITDA, and a 10x multiple — supports his $30-plus-per-share framework and makes FLL his best idea for 2025.