Why Sam Altman is against a single superintelligence
Summary
- Sam Altman prefers a plural AI ecosystem over a single superintelligence. His choice is “a trillion AIs of slightly superhuman intelligence” over “one AI of 1 trillion IQ,” because mutual checks could reproduce society’s resilience. This is a direction people must actively pursue; agent teams also expand how much compute can productively attack one problem.
- AI-driven vulnerability discovery could force a rebuild of the software stack. Collison argues for architectural changes, and Altman sees entirely new routers, operating systems and applications becoming feasible. The first day of “PHP week” went better than Altman feared, but “I assume some bad things are going to happen,” especially if AI invalidates existing assumptions about hardware security.
- Altman expects the cost of automated scientific discovery to fall sharply after expensive frontier experiments. He estimates roughly $10 million, “maybe a little more,” for Navier–Stokes and bets the work could be repeated at 1/100th the cost a year later through better models and methods. The tension extends beyond economics: watching models solve researchers’ hardest problems brought excitement alongside “a feeling of something ending.”
- Compute supply remains constrained by producers’ memories of previous investment busts. Altman says DRAM makers remain cautious even as he expects each to generate roughly $100 billion of annual free cash flow. He wants five-year compute ownership costs to fall from an illustrative $70 billion per gigawatt to $20 billion, requiring more supply, cheaper energy and compression of supplier margins: “the invisible hand is failing right now.”
- Enterprise AI spending is becoming a capital-allocation problem before the operating playbook is settled. Stripe spends roughly 1% of OpEx on tokens; Collison expects 5%, 10% and 20% to follow. Altman agrees many businesses will eventually spend tens of percentage points, but currently sees underuse as the bigger problem; even OpenAI’s AI-assisted research workflow remains “lots of experimentation.”
- Personal agents could move commerce toward consumers’ preferred interfaces while preserving merchants’ deeper advantages. Altman thinks agents still await their Macintosh moment: the breakthrough is reliability—“It will just work.” Collison argues HTML is rarely the moat; Altman would still choose Amazon “10 out of 10 times” inside ChatGPT because of delivery and returns, with Collison emphasizing fulfillment.
- AI’s commercial metrics lag the capabilities and experiences customers actually value. Altman prioritizes scientific discovery and being enjoyable to work with, neither adequately captured by benchmarks. OpenAI nearly abandoned token pricing, but customers preferred token-based bills—even if inflated and more expensive—to opaque task quotes; the desired model feels like “a really thoughtful and challenging, but still respectful, senior coworker.”
Deep dive
1. Cybersecurity needs an architectural reset
Collison wants an architectural fix beyond patching PHP or rewriting individual codebases in Rust. Altman says models are improving rapidly while people have only begun applying them across the internet’s enormous code surface. Startups proposing entirely new routers, operating systems and application stacks would have sounded impossible two years ago; he bets the model for building systems and networks will change.
Asked whether deliberately training cyber capabilities was a mistake, Altman acknowledges the industry’s unconvincing bargain: promised cancer cures and cheaper services against job loss, lost agency and a surveillance state. “This is a terrible sales pitch.” He defends iterative deployment so people can define better lives themselves, rather than sit on basic income while a few square miles of San Francisco make decisions about the future. He insists releases must be safe and warns against accumulating unreleased capabilities.
The first day of “PHP week” went better than Altman’s worst fears 10 days earlier. He reports stories of people using models to build patches and defend systems, including an individual company planning a quick scan and deployment while taking its application offline for an hour. “I assume some bad things are going to happen,” he cautions. The deeper uncertainty is whether AI discovers hardware vulnerabilities involving physics humans do not understand, invalidating defenders’ threat models.
Collison challenges the pessimism about sandboxing: why not use models to construct stronger sandboxes? Altman thinks containment works to a point, monitoring—including activations—further, and eventually requires highly trusted alignment with operators’ intent and permanent human control. Against a theoretical AI a million times smarter than the best security researcher, alignment must be reliable enough to keep defenses ahead of capability.
2. Agent teams expand useful compute and the possibilities for pluralism
The economic change behind agent teams is how much compute one problem can use productively. A few years ago, Altman says, one could not productively spend more than $1: having GPT-4 generate 100,000 tokens did not make extended software development work. Chain-of-thought and test-time compute unlocked longer work; teams can now run 10,000 times in parallel. The gap between typical and highly productive users keeps widening.
Competing incentives among agents look promising to Altman, including for safety. Society’s resilience comes from mutual checks, collaboration, pluralism and democracy: “I would much rather intuitively have a trillion AIs of slightly superhuman intelligence join society than one AI of 1 trillion IQ join society.” Teams may have different alignment properties; this decentralized outcome requires deliberate effort.
The early-internet parallel is creative agency. Altman describes 8- or 10-year-olds making complete games; a full 3D game can now take 10 minutes. This generation expects computers to implement its ideas: “The computer’s supposed to make it.” Conversely, a Codex outage at OpenAI prompted the unsettling realization, “Whoa, what if you couldn’t?”
3. Automated discovery gets cheaper while its human cost remains unresolved
OpenAI deliberately let math spending run unconstrained for a week to explore agent-team scaling: smartest models or more copies, longer or shorter rollouts? Altman estimates “order $10 million” for Navier–Stokes, “maybe a little more,” while later proofs cost much less. He confirms hundreds of millions spent on this kind of work, including discoveries beyond the 700 proofs Collison references; additional results remain unpublished.
Altman is confident in “10x improvements per year” in converting dollars or compute into useful results. He bets Navier–Stokes could be redone at 1/100th the cost a year later through smarter models and better approaches, rather than merely knowing the proof. His principle is to explore the expensive frontier, then let optimization pressure make those capabilities efficient at mass scale.
The dispute concerns what discovery displaces. Collison compares unhappy mathematicians with longshoremen resisting port automation; Altman says humanity deserves fundamental knowledge but researchers also deserve sensitivity. Watching models dispatch people’s hardest research problems from their academic careers across fields brought excitement and “much more sadness and melancholy, and a feeling of something ending than I was expecting.” The possibility of solving something unknown had itself given scientists’ lives meaning.
4. Compute scarcity reflects supply-chain history and physical constraints
Compute will have exuberance, busts, shortages and gluts, but Altman expects demand for sufficiently capable, sufficiently cheap models to keep growing. Collison asks why high prices are not curing scarce supply. Altman points to DRAM’s history: spending $20 billion of CapEx to make $19 billion, with recurring near-bankruptcy. Even as he expects each producer to generate roughly $100 billion of annual free cash flow, that history restrains investment.
Local inference can worsen global scarcity, Altman argues: limited DRAM sitting in personal computers used 5% of the time delivers worse utilization than cloud pooling. OpenAI has developed its own chip emphasizing intelligence per watt. He says only one company on Earth seems to know how to do lithography, while producing the tape-out design file is well understood and “a great problem for AI.”
Altman’s longer-term response includes AI-operated fabs, robots making components, energy equipment and “self-replicating data centers.” Collison pushes back that today’s bottlenecks are permitting and components, rather than construction labor. Altman frames robots making more components as a long-term answer; current innovation includes components for industrial robots that manufacture faster.
For five-year total ownership cost per gigawatt, Altman uses $70 billion illustratively and wants $20 billion, alongside 10x better performance from smarter models annually. That requires much more supply, cheaper energy and compressed supplier margins. Free materials and zero profits might only just reach $20 billion within today’s energy costs. When Collison questions whether $2 billion would mean something had gone wrong, Altman asks why the cost should not be as low as possible and says he is pro-deflationary technology, though he cannot imagine $2 billion. Rising dollars per gigawatt would, in his framing, indicate supply failing to keep up.
5. AI research and enterprise budgets still lack settled operating rules
AI-assisted research can already take a request such as “Find me a 5% compute efficiency win,” Altman says. He does not think anyone yet knows how to elicit a transformer-sized architectural breakthrough; applying the math-training pipeline to AI research will probably work. He also thinks limits on individual model intelligence may be necessary “at least for a while—maybe for a long while,” potentially constraining progress by choice.
Pressed on the actual research loop and what to ask GPT-7, Altman says OpenAI is experimenting with questions and team configurations, expecting substantial learning over the next three months. OpenAI gives broad compute discretion for important work but is skeptical of high usage for its own sake: there are no token leaderboards, and high token use can hurt promotion. Altman says an agent can be instructed to do its best with $10,000 of compute; a competitor allowed $100,000 on the same problem has an obvious advantage.
Stripe spends roughly 1% of OpEx on tokens, Collison says, and he expects 5%, 10% and 20% to follow; eventually many companies may spend tens of percentage points. Altman agrees but currently sees underuse as the bigger problem, explicitly admitting seller bias. Collison pushes back that scaling makes allocation unavoidable. Altman accepts that serious cost optimization will eventually become appropriate.
6. Personal agents shift interfaces without erasing trust and fulfillment
Personal agents have not had their Macintosh moment, Altman argues. Intelligence, context and tools are the ingredients, but today’s products are not indispensable like coding agents or ChatGPT. The winner might resemble Dots, Muse or Grokbot; the difference is reliability: “It will just work.” He thinks a small number of ideas separates current products from mainstream agents that consistently complete increasingly complex tasks.
Collison’s objection to embedded business chatbots is distribution: consumers want their primary chat app to find an order and obtain a refund. Companies fear losing control and their moat. His pushback: “your defensibility probably did not come from your ability to put together HTML.” It came from brand loyalty and product selection, though businesses disagree with him.
Altman agrees, acknowledging his bias: he would choose Amazon “10 out of 10 times” inside ChatGPT and pay more because he trusts delivery and returns. Collison adds the fulfillment network. On computer use, Altman’s rough instinct favors eventual permission to delegate software interactions to AI, but he lacks high confidence. Both welcome eliminating repetitive form-filling, such as repeatedly supplying family medical histories.
7. Benchmarks and token bills poorly capture model value
Scientific discovery and being enjoyable to work with are Altman’s two priorities; neither has a great benchmark. He believes OpenAI currently resists benchmaxxing better than other labs, while conceding it has not always done so. For interaction quality, he prefers Emmett Shear’s formulation: “a really thoughtful and challenging, but still respectful, senior coworker.”
OpenAI nearly replaced token pricing with a quoted price per prompt, then reconsidered after strong customer resistance. Customers preferred token-based units, even if inflated and more expensive, to opaque task quotes: they wanted to understand the bill and feared future exploitation. Outcomes vary too much across use cases to provide a standard unit; Altman also rejects inventing an artificial intelligence-equivalent measure.
His pricing example exposes the cognitive burden: choose 10 cents per million tokens from a small model or $10 per token from a large one, then estimate chain-of-thought length. Collison’s defense is that wasted tokens should eventually be squeezed toward an information-theoretic minimum; Altman’s objection is that navigating these differences adds no useful value for customers.