What’s the Deal With Billy Evans? A Spoiler-Filled Guide to ‘You Can See Everything’
Summary
- Billy Evans’s blood-testing startup has raised about $3 million, but Rob Copeland found no working product. Haemanthus pitches pet tests costing roughly $1 instead of, say, $500 at a veterinarian. Evans presented USDA correspondence as regulatory reassurance; when Copeland checked, the agency said, “That’s not what that means.”
- A controversial-founder comeback is conceivable, but a fraud conviction raises a different financing barrier. Erin Griffith distinguishes venture capital’s “troll investment” habit from backing convicted fraudsters and thinks a pardon could supply a story investors can tell their LPs. Copeland pushes back: financiers’ desire to prove journalists wrong could itself attract support.
- The strongest evidence against Theranos remains the gap between its advertised capabilities and its actual testing. John Carreyrou contrasts promises of hundreds of tests from one drop with an Edison that could do 12 test types, whose issued results all had to be voided. The device unpacked in the documentary is the unfinished miniLab, which was never used on live patients.
- Carreyrou separates an initially sincere ambition from the subsequent fraud and deliberate cover-up. He dates the decisive turn to the fall 2013 Walgreens launch, when Theranos used modified Siemens equipment despite claiming proprietary capabilities. Holmes’s roughly 90% voting control, coordination with Sunny Balwani, and Theranos’s intimidation of whistleblowers undermine the idea that she was merely misled.
- CoreWeave illustrates how AI’s financing assumptions could break before its technological promise is settled. Copeland cites approximately $70 billion in liabilities across 51 data centers and debt-servicing costs starting to double. With companies discussing borrowing as much as $10 trillion, his prediction is that the financial story will unfold “faster than the technological” one.
- A potential SpaceX–Tesla merger could increase Musk’s control and extend his investment runway. Griffith interprets the exploration through Tesla shareholders’ greater ability to push back, particularly on spending such as robotics. Copeland stresses that earlier consolidation has helped Musk so far, while warning that “reporters make terrible securities analysts.”
- The documentary generates sympathy without resolving responsibility in Holmes’s favor. Carreyrou thinks she knew about the original A24 arrangement’s potential profits and regards Evans as both emotionally invested and opportunistic. He nevertheless says he thinks her 11-year, three-month sentence was “perhaps” disproportionate and finds her distress before prison genuine.
Deep dive
1. Haemanthus has financing, but its operating claims remain unproven
Copeland initially thought the tip about Evans’s blood-testing startup was a prank: “I thought I was being scammed.” Haemanthus, named for the blood lily, proposes inexpensive pet testing—roughly $1 per test rather than, say, a $500 veterinarian’s test. It had raised somewhere around $3 million, which Copeland considers insufficient for the undertaking, and lacked “a product that does anything.”
The supposed regulatory advantage did not survive a straightforward check. Evans sent Copeland correspondence with the USDA dated October 2024, presenting it as evidence that the company was allowed to proceed. Copeland called the agency: “That’s not what that means.” Invitations to visit the laboratory were similarly qualified; when he asked what he would see, Evans acknowledged that the lab was not working yet.
Holmes was absent from the pitch deck, and Copeland’s impression was that she had nothing to do with the company. The documentary instead shows the couple developing it together. Copeland also saw a Theranos echo in the device photographs, which looked “suspiciously identical” to Theranos’s, while Evans gave long speeches about his scientific qualifications and experience helping start a radar company for self-driving cars. Copeland questions how serious the filmed 2023 fundraising calls were: Haemanthus really starts around 2024, he says, and was still operating from an Austin house during his reporting. Griffith notes that Holmes is not on its patent.
Evans approached Jim Breyer and Michael Dell, but Copeland did not interview anyone who invested; records identified an Austin tapas-restaurant owner whom Evans called a friend. Griffith emphasizes how unusual Breyer’s public rejection was. Investors generally avoid criticizing companies they decline because they want to remain “founder-friendly”—a convention that also discouraged warnings about the original Theranos.
2. Genuine affection and calculated opportunity can coexist
Griffith finds Evans’s sentencing letter an early version of the documentary’s defense. Among more than 100 supporting letters Holmes collected, his ran eight single-spaced pages and presented her as misunderstood rather than deceptive: “Liz has no ability to sell something. She simply believes in things with such depth that it is alluring. She’s more of a zealot than a showman.”
Copeland recognizes a different performance: Evans volunteers answers to questions nobody asked. Asked whether he dated other people when he met Holmes, he announces, “I was dating three people.” To Copeland, this resembles a corporate executive with elementary media training, answering the question he wishes had been asked. His professed openness also coexists with withholding information.
Asked whether the couple are in love, Griffith says yes: their relationship felt like “the most genuine thing in the whole movie.” Copeland is less convinced overall, but recognizes familiarity in their disagreement over making scrambled eggs. “They had definitely made eggs together before”—a mundane interaction that, to him, carries recognizable domestic history.
Carreyrou later answers whether Evans is a mark or an opportunist: “I think he’s both.” He believes Holmes is using a wealthy heir’s support, while Evans sees opportunities for his career and for making money from the film. That does not exclude love or sincere outrage on her behalf. The digital replica shown in the film, however, “feels exploitative” to Carreyrou.
3. A comeback needs investors willing to finance the rehabilitation story
Griffith sees a precedent in venture capital’s controversial-founder bets. Andreessen Horowitz backed Andy Rubin, who was pushed out of Google after accusations of sexual impropriety, and gave Adam Neumann more than $300 million for his WeWork, WeLive, and Flow ventures. Such deals can advertise indifference to media criticism or cancellation. But she finds few parallels involving actual fraud convictions. Former Nikola CEO Trevor Milton’s new aircraft venture followed a Trump pardon; she does not know whether it has raised much money. She also notes that Nikola’s much-publicized truck video showed the vehicle rolling down a hill, rather than driving itself.
Copeland’s pushback is that financiers particularly enjoy proving journalists and pundits wrong. Renewed condemnation can activate that impulse rather than extinguish interest: “I could see a universe in which it works.” Griffith thinks a pardon could be decisive because it would provide an easily communicated explanation for investors—and for those investors’ limited partners.
Read sees a political dimension in Evans’s increasingly reactionary presentation and Jessica Reed Krauss’s description of Holmes as “the original MAGA.” The film reveals Evans running Holmes’s Twitter account, though he claims either that she supplies the words or that he posts on her behalf; authorship of individual posts remains uncertain. Griffith distinguishes very-online commentary from Holmes-like inspirational language. The exchange shows how difficult it is to separate her public persona from his management of it.
On whether Holmes might have a phone in prison, Copeland says phones are an open secret in prisons, and that guards tolerate them because inmates occupied with TikTok are less likely to cause trouble. He cites his reporting around Martin Shkreli and Sam Bankman-Fried as context for that claim.
4. CoreWeave makes AI infrastructure a financing question
Copeland describes CoreWeave as an AI middleman: buying processors, installing them in data centers, and leasing capacity to customers such as Anthropic. Rapid expansion has produced something like $70 billion in liabilities across 51 data centers. He says its stock is falling sharply and debt-servicing costs are starting to double—a familiar financing problem for a business built around markets continuing upward.
Asked whether this is a canary for broader infrastructure spending, Copeland calls it an early sign. Companies have discussed needing to borrow as much as $10 trillion, yet financing is already showing strain near the beginning of that climb. CoreWeave represents a wider segment of the market; in his view, the financial consequences will become apparent faster than the technological ones.
Griffith connects this to Anthropic’s IPO: investors are testing whether AI demand is effectively unlimited or sensitive to what customers will pay, with consequences for infrastructure suppliers. Copeland contrasts the roughly $1.5 trillion Anthropic offering discussed with CoreWeave’s roughly $40 billion size. These are substantial counterparties, he stresses, and Ken Griffin’s recent AI-bubble warning adds to his attention to what might fail first.
5. Musk’s merger exploration centers on control
Griffith reports that SpaceX’s earnings call confirmed exploration of a potential Tesla merger, with independent-director committees being established. Musk’s explanation—“Because I’m a conflicted party, I can’t actually be in the discussions”—captures the governance tension. The proposed transaction follows speculation that SpaceX’s move into public markets would make combining the companies easier.
Copeland cautions that “reporters make terrible securities analysts”: the xAI–SpaceX combination helped the IPO and has worked so far. Griffith traces the pattern back to Tesla buying SolarCity, despite criticism that a stronger business was rescuing a weaker one. Her interpretation is that combining SpaceX and Tesla could restore Musk’s control and give him more runway for costly investments such as robots.
Read’s separate story is Joel Kaplan leaving Meta after 15 years. He characterizes Kaplan as its conservative intermediary, helping steer the company rightward through political controversies. Read thinks exhaustion and wealth are likelier explanations for departure than an anticipated Republican electoral defeat; his Rubio 2028 suggestion is explicitly speculation. Copeland notes that former Goldman Sachs banker Dina Powell McCormick is replacing Kaplan.
6. Theranos’s technical failure was specific, measurable, and concealed
Asked for the strongest evidence of fraud, Carreyrou starts with Holmes’s explicit 2014–2015 representations: hundreds of blood tests from one finger-prick drop. The Edison could do 12 types of tests, but every result Theranos issued for those types had to be voided. The issue was therefore both the number of advertised capabilities and the trustworthiness of the limited testing actually performed.
The documentary’s unpacking scene introduces another distinction: Holmes displays the miniLab, not the Edison used for patients. The miniLab was supposed to incorporate more components and capabilities, but was never finished or considered reliable enough for patient use. Carreyrou adds a narrower qualification: “I don’t think the miniLab had a single test ever validated on it.”
Carreyrou does not think Holmes dropped out of Stanford intending to defraud people. She wanted to emulate Steve Jobs, build a successful company, and hoped her idea would work. His account is of corners cut and lies accumulating afterward. “It wasn’t all a fraud from the beginning”—a distinction that preserves initial ambition without excusing later conduct.
He dates the full-fledged fraud to the fall 2013 Walgreens launch. Theranos was not ready and modified Siemens machines to process finger-stick samples. Pre-diluting those samples compounded the machines’ own dilution process, creating potential accuracy problems. Beyond reliability, the concealed substitution mattered: the company was relying on a century-old German conglomerate’s equipment while representing that it possessed its own breakthrough technology.
7. The cover-up and voting control contradict the helpless-founder defense
Carreyrou’s first primary source was former laboratory director Adam Rosendorff, whom he recalls contacting around February 2015. Rosendorff suggested Tyler Shultz as possible corroboration: a former employee who had raised concerns and was also the grandson of prominent Theranos director George Shultz. After roughly two months without a response, Tyler unexpectedly called Carreyrou at his Wall Street Journal desk.
Tyler had first raised concerns with Holmes, then encountered Balwani’s anger and lawyers; his grandfather also refused to believe him. Theranos later ambushed him at George Shultz’s house, seeking admissions, recantation paperwork, and other sources’ identities. Legal fees nearly bankrupted his parents. He slept with a knife under his pillow. Carreyrou calls it “a ruthless cover-up,” rather than a disagreement about misunderstood claims.
Holmes also sought to stop the reporting through Rupert Murdoch, Theranos’s single biggest investor, with $125 million invested. Carreyrou recalls her visiting Murdoch’s office in September 2015, less than a month before publication, to ask him to kill the story. His newsroom was only three floors below the meeting.
Read’s devil’s-advocate question—could it all have been Sunny?—gets an unequivocal “No way.” Carreyrou points to years of texts showing the couple jointly running the company. More fundamentally, Holmes was CEO, board chair, and held something like 90% voting control. “She was at the controls of this thing,” and, in his account, was piloting the cover-up.
8. Carreyrou interprets the film’s ambiguity as another calculated defense
The documentary’s second half asks whether Holmes knew the original A24 deal would allow her and Evans to profit. Carreyrou’s conclusion is categorical: “There’s no way she didn’t know.” This is his interpretation of the film, rather than a newly presented documentary proof, but it shapes his skepticism toward the couple’s explanations.
He similarly interprets Holmes’s apparent difficulty with Abbott and Costello’s “Who’s on First?” as “playing dumb.” His reasoning follows the film’s sequence: Fielder first floats the possibility that she experiences the world differently, making innocent statements others interpreted as lies. Carreyrou thinks her subsequent behavior supports that offered narrative: “Behaving this way helps me.”
Read presses him on what makes him so sure. Carreyrou cites observing Holmes during SEC questioning, trial testimony, and her response to his reporting, including a combative conference appearance about 10 days after his first article. His formulation retains a qualification: “For the most part, she knew exactly what she was doing.” He mostly rejects the alternative explanation that different perception accounts for her major lies.
9. Sympathy leaves the question of responsibility intact
Carreyrou explicitly feels sympathy for Holmes. He recalls her sentence as 11 years and three months, calling it heavy and “perhaps” out of proportion to the crime. He finds her distress genuine in the scene where she talks to lawyers about prison while Evans speaks to Fielder nearby. Read describes the film as generating sympathy while retaining the damning evidence behind her imprisonment.
Asked why the story still deserves attention, Carreyrou returns to Holmes’s agency: she invited filmmakers into her home 34 days before prison to retell the story, rewrite history, and have people feel sorry for her. He suspects the result is more damaging than she hoped. The renewed attention also sends viewers toward factual reporting: his publisher had just ordered another 10,000 copies of Bad Blood, and he welcomes audiences seeking the underlying account.
A final listener asks whether persistent evasion can become a genuine inability to recognize reality. Carreyrou again rejects that explanation: he thinks Holmes knows she lied and did wrong. Judge Davila’s question about inability versus refusal to accept responsibility resonated because she had repeatedly declined opportunities for contrition. For Carreyrou, the unresolved issue is her continuing refusal to acknowledge the harm.