Summary

TUSK’s setup is a roughly $118 million equity value against $135 million of unrestricted cash, with additional cash-like claims still to come. At approximately $2.50 a share, Doug Garber sees about $2.80 a share already on the balance sheet and describes another roughly $0.80-$0.90 a share of potential cash; Andrew Walker later models $0.87. The market’s posture: “Unless they can see it in front of them, they’re not giving them credit for that.”
Two transactions transformed Mammoth from a liquidity-strapped energy operator into a cash-rich allocation vehicle. It received roughly $180 million to settle approximately $360 million owed by PREPA, then sold the transmission-and-distribution business it had built for perhaps $10 million for just under $110 million, around 9x and four times tangible book. That successful exit is the strongest evidence against the historical pattern Andrew describes as “investing a dollar and turning it into 70 cents.”
The discount persists because Puerto Rico destroyed credibility and the remaining operations historically consumed cash. Mammoth accrued PREPA interest for years, once highlighted roughly $650 per share owed, and ultimately wrote off well over $100 million when it settled largely for principal. The remaining $20 million administrative claim may be sound, but its receipt could take “one, two, or seven years,” while last year’s weak natural-gas market left the operating businesses cash-flow negative.
Wexford’s roughly 46% ownership aligns a large shareholder with the cash, but leaves minorities dependent on its judgment. Garber considers Wexford effectively in control and argues its reputation and continued access to public markets discourage abuse; Walker notes that a controller can still pursue a discounted take-private or sit indefinitely on idle cash. The unexplained oddity is Wexford’s continued 13G filing despite owning well above 20% and having deep board ties.
Capital allocation—not collection of the remaining cash—is the thesis-defining variable. Despite a repurchase authorization dating to August 2023 and extended in 2024, Garber expects neither meaningful buybacks nor a dividend; he expects investment in industrial and rental businesses. His preferred framing is “a private equity fund with no two and 20 at 50 cents on the dollar,” but Walker’s rejoinder is that the discount disappears economically if each deployed dollar becomes only another dollar—or less.
The residual energy assets offer optionality, but neither speaker treats them as high-quality businesses. Garber assigns only about $1 million to sand and $20 million to pressure pumping, while acknowledging the latter could be worth zero or $20-$30 million if gas activity recovers. A move in US gas demand from roughly 105 Bcf/d toward the cited 120-130 Bcf/d range could revive Northeast activity, yet Garber disliked Mammoth spending about $12 million on Tier 4 engines: it looked like “putting good money after bad.”
The next CEO is the clearest catalyst because the company is effectively a blank slate with approximately $150 million to deploy. Garber wants a capital allocator with sourcing and execution ability, rather than another divisional operator; Walker wants evidence that the cash will not become a permanent low-return pool. Garber sees limited downside, while Walker says it could be a $7 stock if everything works; the discussion identifies destructive reinvestment or a cheap controller-led buyout as the key loss paths.

Deep dive

1. Puerto Rico and one strong sale rebuilt the balance sheet

Garber, who disclosed owning TUSK, begins with a company that had been off the radar and liquidity-strapped: roughly $118 million of market capitalization at about $2.50 per share, weak natural-gas utilization, payment-in-kind interest and sale-leasebacks. The eventual PREPA settlement supplied about $180 million and relieved a business that had been operating under severe liquidity pressure.
Mammoth had claimed approximately $360 million from PREPA, including accrued interest, after restoring Puerto Rico’s grid following a hurricane. Garber estimates the underlying principal amount at roughly $145 million, meaning Mammoth recovered principal plus some interest, but nowhere near the full contractual claim it had carried.
Walker’s credibility objection is sharper than the recovery percentage: Mammoth included the accruing interest in adjusted EBITDA, and management was still discussing roughly $650 per share owed on a Q4 2022 call before writing off well over $100 million in 2024. Garber says the accounting followed the contract until settlement, but concedes he never expected full recovery.
The cleaner success was transmission and distribution. Mammoth reportedly started the business five or six years earlier with perhaps $10 million, grew it organically, and sold it for just under $110 million—roughly 9x and four times tangible book—after utility spending and AI-related power demand made such assets attractive.

2. The cash bridge explains both the upside and the discount

After the sale, Mammoth held about $155 million of cash, of which $20 million was restricted in a letter of credit associated with Puerto Rico municipalities until October. Excluding that restriction leaves roughly $135 million, or approximately $2.80 per share, against a share price near $2.50.
Another $40-$50 million is described in three buckets: $10 million in sale escrow, the $20 million letter of credit expected back in October, and approximately $20 million of accounts receivable tied to the eventual bondholder settlement. Garber discounts the uncertain receivable to about $0.75-$0.80 on the dollar, while Walker later uses approximately $0.87 per share for the prospective cash.
The final $20 million is an agreed administrative claim, giving it higher priority, but Garber offers no timing certainty: it could arrive in “one, two, or seven years.” His explanation of the mispricing is behavioral as much as mathematical—after the PREPA ordeal, investors treat the Puerto Rico-related amounts as “too complicated” until the cash physically arrives.

3. Cash burn makes a sub-cash valuation less anomalous

Walker notes that small companies trading below cash are common when the operating business consumes it. Mammoth’s principal energy operations were cash-flow negative last year amid an approximately $2.21 average natural-gas price and periods of almost no utilization; even a recent quarter with roughly $1 million of EBITDA remained cash-flow negative after capital expenditure.
Garber believes the remaining company is now approximately free-cash-flow neutral, provided the frac business is doing about $1.5 million and the cash earns interest. That would distinguish today’s setup from the prior year, but the discussion leaves capital allocation—not merely operating neutrality—as the central unresolved question.
The comparison to busted biotechnology companies frames the real issue. Those stocks can trade at half cash because managers without equity ownership may prefer “literal lottery tickets” and several more years of salary to liquidation; Walker jokingly describes them taking “a flamethrower to their cash balance.” TUSK avoids that exact misalignment, but not capital-allocation risk itself.

4. Wexford provides alignment without giving minorities control

Wexford owns roughly 45%-46%, Mammoth is reportedly its largest disclosed 13F holding, and the board chairman is a retired Wexford general counsel. Garber therefore views Wexford as effectively “calling the shots,” even if its precise board control was not established in the conversation.
Walker flags an unresolved governance anomaly: investment managers generally switch from Schedule 13G to 13D after crossing 20%, yet Wexford remains a 13G filer. Garber’s candid response—“That’s a great question. I actually don’t have the answer”—leaves the legal structure and degree of formal control unclear.
Garber’s mitigant is reputational. Wexford has repeatedly formed companies and taken them public, so mistreating minority holders could damage future market access; moreover, nearly half the cash economically belongs to Wexford itself. Still, he concedes outsiders are “in the cheap seats,” hoping that Wexford’s interests remain aligned with theirs.
The adverse scenario is a take-private at a material discount to Garber’s net asset value. He notes that nominal protections such as fairness opinions can be weak when banks are paid by the transaction sponsor, while Walker adds a subtler risk: Wexford might simply wait years for a grand-slam acquisition, leaving shareholders with a bank-account-like IRR.

5. Repurchases look attractive but are not Garber’s base case

Mammoth authorized a repurchase in August 2023, extended it in 2024 and amended its revolver to permit buybacks, yet apparently bought no shares. Although Garber says repurchasing stock below cash would mean “buying 50 cents on the dollar,” he does not expect meaningful execution because the company and public float are so small.
Nor does he expect a dividend. His base case is deployment into more stable industrial businesses while Mammoth gradually exits pressure pumping and sand at better than liquidation value. The investment therefore requires patience with both the deployment pace and Wexford’s sourcing pipeline—precisely the variables investors cannot yet underwrite.
Garber’s compact formulation is that shareholders are “buying into a private equity fund with no two and 20 at 50 cents on the dollar.” Walker accepts the arithmetic but challenges the analogy’s implied value creation: if low-quality businesses absorb the cash at mediocre returns, the apparent discount merely converts into a declining IRR.

6. Energy is a call option, not the desired destination

Mammoth’s northern-white sand business was largely displaced by local sand and now sells only modest volumes into Canada. Garber gives it approximately $1 million of value—about $500,000 of EBITDA at 2x—making it evidence of historical capital destruction rather than a thesis pillar.
He values pressure pumping at roughly $20 million, using $8 million of EBITDA at 2.5x, but explicitly brackets the outcome from zero to $20-$30 million if the cycle strengthens. Mammoth recently spent about $12 million upgrading to Tier 4 engines so its fleets could remain competitive, retain customers and eventually sell as an operating platform rather than scrap.
Garber disliked that reinvestment, calling it potentially “putting good money after bad,” but sees a macro option. US gas demand was around 105 Bcf/d, with cited expectations of 120-130 Bcf/d from LNG exports and AI data centers; as free associated Permian gas slows, incremental supply might again require Haynesville and Northeast drilling.
Walker’s response is that favorable cyclicality does not repair poor economics. He points to weak historical EBITDA in several remaining segments, including engineering and drilling services, and says only scaled operators reliably earn through-cycle returns. Garber agrees Mammoth lacks scale and hopes management uses the next strong window for “one more hurrah”—operate, improve and sell.

7. The industrial pivot still has to prove its returns

Garber identifies engineering, fiber infrastructure and equipment rental as the intended higher-quality core. He likens engineering to a tiny Jacobs and rental to “a little tiny URI,” with telehandlers and cranes serving energy today but potentially broadening into construction; Walker counters that the reported economics still look commodity-like.
The most controversial recent deployment was approximately $11.5-$12 million for what Walker believes were eight small passenger aircraft. Walker says three different people independently asked him to raise it—not because Mammoth bought the CEO a private jet, but because aircraft are literal commodities and the company has not earned trust as an allocator.
Garber is not “bullish” on the purchase so much as relatively comfortable: it came with contracts, should add free cash flow and might earn around 10%. In his quality ladder, energy assets are “C,” contracted industrial assets are “B-ish,” and capital-light professional services or software would be “A”; moving upward is progress, even without acquiring a wonderful business.
Walker’s hardest valuation objection survives every appraisal. A year-end appraisal placed assets near $190 million before subtracting roughly $45 million associated with the sold business, while Garber’s own sum-of-the-parts value for the remaining operations is about $73 million. The gap may demonstrate hidden value—or simply document past cases of turning one invested dollar into fifty cents.

8. A capital allocator at the top could resolve the blank slate

The CEO who ran the sold infrastructure operation went with that business while remaining interim Mammoth CEO through July, creating an unusual temporary arrangement. Both speakers therefore treat the permanent CEO appointment—and the accompanying plan for roughly $150 million—as the next major catalyst.
Garber would prefer a private-equity-style allocator who can source and execute deals, not an operator drawn from one of Mammoth’s subscale divisions. He speaks positively of CFO Mark’s understanding of the businesses and strategy, but says the CEO’s crucial capability is building a credible acquisition funnel, potentially alongside Wexford’s private pipeline.
On hard assets, Garber cites a possible $10 million from selling underperforming walking drilling rigs internationally and rough liquidation value of $6-$7 per share when cash, claims and steel are combined. He stresses that appraised value “doesn’t count unless you’re generating cash from it,” and Mammoth does not currently plan liquidation.
The closing asymmetry is therefore conditional, not mechanical. Walker asks, “How do I lose in this one?” and says it could be a $7 stock if everything works; the discussed loss paths are value-destructive reinvestment or a cheap take-private. Walker’s epitaph for the history—Puerto Rico is “the place where stock market capital goes to die”—explains why investors demand proof before embracing the clean-slate story.

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