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60. The Midterm Bill Comes Due: Tariffs, Gas Prices, Electricity Bills, and My Stocks - Gavin Newton-Tanzer

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Topics AI Data Center Power Bottlenecks AI Workforce Displacement and Labor Disruption AI-Powered Prediction Markets and Fact Verification
Pioneers Gavin Newton-Tanzer

Summary

  • Gavin attributes the Democrats’ sweep of both chambers mainly to the cost of living: war, gas prices, and tariffs all became bills voters had to pay every day. The episode was recorded on November 5, 2026. Raymond reported that Democrats won 240 of 435 House seats and 54 of 100 Senate seats; he also cited the cost of 15 gallons of regular gas, which rose from $32 in 2020 to nearly $60 in October 2026. Gavin says candidate quality improved, but the bigger force was Trump “dragging down the entire party.”

  • Texas turning blue will have consequences that last for years, but it does not prove that this Republican stronghold has permanently shifted. Raymond compared the more than 4 million votes in this year’s gubernatorial election with the 6.5 million Trump received in Texas in 2024. Gavin says turnout was decisive: some voters who had reluctantly backed Republicans were so angry this time that they stayed home. Presidential elections bring different turnout, candidates, and competitive dynamics; Texas may still be a red-leaning purple state.

  • Data centers are more likely to move ahead through concessions and negotiation, with local opposition adding costs for developers. Gavin expects most projects to reach an agreement, but companies may have to subsidize electricity, accept water inspections, build schools, or provide other public services. Raymond’s constraint is stark: a 1 GW project may require $50B in investment but employ only 50 to 100 people, making it hard for companies to deliver on a new “social contract” through jobs alone.

  • In Gavin’s view, job anxiety is mainly about a mismatch between workers and available roles, while aggressive immigration enforcement spreads fear far beyond the number of people deported. He cites an overall unemployment rate of about 4%, roughly 7 million job seekers, and 7 million openings, noting that the US lacks electricians, plumbers, nurses, and other workers even as young people often prepare for different kinds of jobs. On ICE, he recalls deportations of about 250,000 to 300,000 people, but says the political result was “10 million people afraid”—potentially including legal immigrants and some moderate Republican voters.

  • A change in control of both chambers does not mean the Iran war will end quickly, and Congress’s budget leverage may not be enough to move Trump. Gavin says Congress can legislate, restrict funding, and apply pressure, but the president can still veto bills; overriding a veto takes a two-thirds vote in each chamber. Raymond hopes Republican defections will change things, while Gavin says getting dozens of lawmakers to break ranks would amount to a “political revolution.”

  • For Musk, the more direct risks are hearings, disclosures, and project delays; Gavin does not conclude that Tesla or SpaceX will suffer major damage. Congressional subpoenas could require him to travel to Washington, answer questions, and hand over materials he would rather keep private; some projects “might” slow down as a result. Gavin says the bar for a serious threat is both parties targeting a company; hostility from one party alone “usually isn’t enough.”

  • Gavin sees political gridlock as a near-term positive for business but a long-term negative for ordinary people, with no necessary major shift in US-China relations. Entrepreneurs may feel that with the government caught up in infighting and less able to spring new policies on them, “we can finally sleep well.” But a weaker Trump will also have a harder time delivering on negotiating commitments that depend on domestic US action. Whether tariffs will be removed is “hard to say”; Gavin leans toward policy largely staying as it is.

  • The odds for 2028 have already been reshuffled, but Gavin’s view of Vance’s chances in the primary shifted during the discussion. Raymond cited Polymarket odds showing Vance falling from about 35% to 17%, while Jon Ossoff rose to 20%; Ossoff’s odds had reportedly doubled in the previous 24 hours. Gavin first said Vance would struggle to win the primary, then put his chances at “50-50.” Ossoff is drawing attention for being young, focused on the cost of living, and having shown he can win in a red state.

Deep dive

1. The election was, first and foremost, a cost-of-living bill

  • According to the results Raymond reported at the time of recording on November 5, 2026, Democrats won 240 of 435 House seats and 54 of 100 Senate seats, while Texas also changed parties in its governor’s race. He called it a “blue tsunami.” The question: after Trump won all 7 swing states in 2024, why did the country swing back so broadly just 2 years later?

  • Raymond used the gas bill to explain the reversal. A 15-gallon fill-up with regular gas cost about $32 in 2020, rose to $59 in 2022, then fell before climbing back to nearly $60 in October 2026. Voters felt an unavoidable daily expense “double,” not the modest changes reflected in macroeconomic indicators.

  • Gavin says inflation before the Iran war cannot be blamed entirely on Trump, but voters see a direct link between the rise in oil prices after the war began in March this year and their costs. Higher prices at the pump are only the first hit: price increases travel through the supply chain, and tariffs push prices up too. A president can say he does not care about inflation or that there is no inflation, but that does not override what households see when they pay their bills.

2. The Democrats’ 2024 loss also reflected punishment from their own voters

  • Gavin starts by explaining where he stands: born in Connecticut, he describes himself as a center-left, moderate Democrat. He has voted for Romney and Obama, but never Trump. He does not read the 2024 result as the Democratic base suddenly disappearing. “We were mad at our own party.”

  • He says Democratic voters expected Biden to serve one term and then pass the baton to a younger candidate. Biden did not do that, and his late withdrawal before the election left the party without a primary. Primaries matter not only as a vote, but as a chance for governors, legislators, and other local politicians to prove themselves on the national stage.

  • Resistance to Harris did not necessarily mean support for Trump. Gavin sums up the view of some moderates: they were unwilling to accept Biden’s vice president as the presidential nominee outright. Some stayed home or never got involved. Trump’s 2024 win cannot simply be read as an affirmative mandate for his agenda.

3. Better candidates in Texas faced the bigger drag from Trump

  • Raymond underscores Texas’s weight: it has 40 electoral votes and is the Republican counterpart to California, a core large state for Democrats. He describes Democrats’ Texas Senate win as their first since 1988 and says the change in the governor’s office broke decades of political inertia.

  • Gavin concedes that Democrats got some things right this time. Comparing Talarico with Ken Paxton, the two candidates had very different public images and family backgrounds, and personal controversies can matter to ordinary voters. But when asked whether Talarico could have won if Trump had not gone to war with Iran, Gavin’s answer is: “Hard to say.”

  • He compares this race with earlier strong Democratic Senate candidates in Texas: Beto O’Rourke was also a formidable candidate, but never broke through. So this result cannot be explained just by Democrats finally finding a good candidate. The bigger explanation is still that Trump dragged down the entire party.

  • This is one of the best possible outcomes for Democrats, and senators and governors tend to serve for years once elected. If Democrats increase their Senate count from 54 to 55 or 56, the impact will be greater still. But Gavin cautions that the next presidential election will be a fresh contest between different candidates; Texas has not permanently turned blue.

4. Campaign money buys turnout from your own supporters

  • Gavin explains the midterm system: senators serve 6-year terms, with roughly a third of the seats up for election every 2 years. Voting does not stop once a president is elected. But midterms require more initiative from voters. Raymond notes that turnout in presidential elections is only in the 50%-plus range; Gavin adds that only a fraction of presidential-year voters show up for midterms.

  • Raymond compares the more than 4 million votes in this year’s Texas governor’s race with the roughly 6.5 million Trump won in Texas in 2024, and asks what the gap of more than 2 million votes means. Gavin’s explanation: some Republicans who had “held their noses” to vote for their party chose to stay home. The shift in the result did not all come from people switching from red to blue.

  • Why did the 2024 presidential election cost $12B, and this midterm $12B too? Gavin says a lot of that money was not spent to persuade Democrats to become Republicans. It was spent to get your own supporters to turn out. “Mobilize the vote” is the key phrase. Anger, disappointment, and disengagement can change an election result on their own.

5. Trump’s primary endorsements are becoming a liability in the general election

  • Raymond lays out the bind facing Republican candidates: in deep-red states, winning the party primary used to nearly guarantee a general-election victory, so candidates had to court Trump’s support. Now, aligning with Trump may help them win the primary but invite voter backlash in the general. Gavin describes the consequences of Republicans allowing that power structure to take hold as “the fox getting into the henhouse.”

  • There are limits to distancing yourself, too. Trump is still president, with channels like Truth Social and a large base of supporters. Getting too close can drag a candidate down; moving too far away can cost them the base. Gavin says not to underestimate Trump: people have called him finished many times before, and he has always come back.

  • Vance expected to inherit Trump’s following, but is now the easiest target for other Republicans: he is closely tied to the Iran war, the administration’s decisions, and Trump’s public endorsements. Gavin imagines opponents saying that nobody is closer to Trump than Vance, and that when he had a chance to change the president’s mind, he did not.

  • Rubio and DeSantis could both exploit that argument. Gavin singles out Florida as still a Republican stronghold, with DeSantis untainted by this administration. He initially judged it hard for Vance to win the primary, while acknowledging that the field often does not come into focus until the primary and presidential debates.

6. Control of both chambers cannot be converted directly into an end to the war

  • Gavin says Congress has no direct authority to stop this war. It can introduce legislation and control the budget, using government funding as leverage. But he is unsure whether budget pressure can influence Trump; Trump has repeatedly shown that he enjoys political fights.

  • Raymond adds that even if legislation limiting the president’s power passed, Trump could veto it. Overriding a veto requires a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate. Given the balance of seats discussed on the show, Democrats would need a large number of Republican lawmakers to break ranks; getting 3 or 5 more would not be enough.

  • Raymond thinks Republicans’ attempts to distance themselves from Trump could make a difference over the next 2 years. Gavin doubts that dozens of Republican lawmakers can be turned against him easily; he says that would amount to a “political revolution.”

  • Gavin therefore does not expect Democratic control of both chambers to end the war quickly. The key is still Trump deciding to withdraw or the two sides reaching an agreement. Raymond doubts a successful negotiation is likely and says Iran seems intent on continuing to fight, while clearly noting that he is not a Middle East expert.

7. Congressional hearings will become a stage for national politics

  • More than directly changing the war, Gavin expects Democrats to make heavy use of subpoenas. People around Trump, his businesses, cabinet officials, and government departments could be required to submit materials and testify before Congress. Raymond specifically mentions the Defense Department, the Justice Department, and members of Trump’s family, and expects a barrage of subpoenas over the next 2 years.

  • Being wealthy or influential does not make someone exempt. Gavin stresses that recipients of subpoenas have to respond. Raymond points to the hearing with TikTok global CEO Shou Zi Chew, familiar to Chinese viewers, as an example of how hostile questioning can put a business leader under public pressure.

  • Hearings also offer a clear personal incentive for lawmakers who want to run for president or raise their profile: they need a moment that will play well on camera. A single question or exchange can turn a local politician into a national figure. Gavin expects them to take an aggressive approach; Raymond suggests AOC might want to go toe-to-toe with Musk.

8. Musk’s political exposure will add disclosure and execution costs

  • Gavin says that by working through DOGE and loudly supporting Trump, Musk effectively put a target on his own back. Even spending heavily through super PACs cannot erase voter anger: donations cannot fix inflation, and after an election, people will come after him.

  • But Gavin draws a clear line around the likely consequences: Musk may have to travel to Washington frequently, answer questions he does not want to answer, and turn over materials he does not want to submit. Some projects “might” move more slowly. That is a long way from saying SpaceX or Tesla will necessarily face major business problems; political trouble is not the same as major damage to a company.

  • Gavin says one party disliking a company “usually isn’t enough”; a serious problem is more likely when both parties want to target it. He cites Microsoft’s past antitrust scrutiny and Bill Gates’s congressional testimony as examples of how deeper risks to a company tend to require broader political and social pressure.

9. Data centers give AI anxiety a physical target

  • Raymond connects Texas turning blue to the capital markets, describing it as the state with the most AI data centers in the US and saying investors will need to reassess what a change in governor means. But both agree that a new governor will not immediately reverse the entire economic policy framework. The real questions are about individual projects and their specific terms.

  • Asked whether Americans would rather live next to a nuclear power plant than a data center, Gavin first says “that’s not true,” then acknowledges that it captures a real sentiment. There is a strong NIMBY response—“not in my backyard.” People may like AI, electricity, and the prospect of making money, but want the facilities built in another state.

  • He says the deeper driver is anxiety about AI and jobs. To boost their companies’ valuations, AI company CEOs keep talking about how many jobs AI will take. Ordinary people may not know where to protest against AI companies, but they can see the data center near their home. The data center becomes a concrete target for the country’s broader anxiety.

  • Electricity bills, water use, and air pollution are specific concerns, but Gavin says the discontent is not only about the facilities themselves. The US spent decades deindustrializing, then suddenly faced hundreds of large infrastructure projects at once, before the public was ready to accept them. The projects are also being built by large, distrusted companies, making them an easy vessel for broader unease.

10. Data centers need a new local social contract

  • Gavin misses the older model: companies provided lasting jobs and supported schools, libraries, and local businesses, giving communities a direct return. As corporate headquarters and workforces became more dispersed and stock prices and valuations more important, he says many companies came to look more like extractors of profit, while people saw fewer benefits and opportunities.

  • He cites Eli Lilly and the Lilly Endowment, founded by the company’s founders, as an example. The endowment has continuously provided substantial support for schools, libraries, and sports teams in Indianapolis, helping build a strong relationship between the company and the city. The point is not abstract philanthropy: residents can name what the company has done for their community.

  • Raymond pushes back that data centers cannot easily replicate the traditional factory model. A 1 GW project may require $50B but employ only 50 to 100 people, leaving it unable to support the old promise through a large workforce. Gavin agrees that jobs can only be part of the return; companies will need to contribute in other ways, such as subsidizing electricity or providing social services.

  • Raymond mentions hundreds of gigawatts in planned capacity and estimates that more than half of incoming governors oppose or would restrict construction. Gavin still thinks most projects will reach an agreement: companies could accept water-quality inspections, build water treatment facilities, subsidize electricity, or support schools or apartment construction. Companies will not spend money when they do not have to; when they do, they will start making concessions.

11. Young people’s frustration comes from a mismatch of jobs, education, and location

  • Gavin’s overall employment picture is an unemployment rate of about 4%, though not at a historic low, with roughly 7 million people looking for work and about 7 million openings. The problem is not that there are no jobs in aggregate; it is that the roles do not match what job seekers want in pay, stability, or type of work.

  • He says there are more than 3,000 universities in the US, alongside a long-standing cultural message that people who do not go to college are “second-class citizens.” But the country currently needs electricians, plumbers, nurses, welders, and other skilled workers, while college graduates are often preparing for white-collar jobs. He says AI cannot do these skilled trades.

  • Location is another mismatch. Young people want to go to New York, Los Angeles, or San Francisco, while opportunities may be in Detroit, Columbus, Cleveland, Phoenix, Austin, Dallas—or in warehouses, hospitals, and schools. Gavin says the key question is whether they are willing to take those jobs. Adjusting expectations can create emotional strain; it does not mean that there are simply no jobs to find.

12. ICE turned a hard-line demand from a minority into widespread fear

  • Gavin starts with a contradiction in the US: it is a country of immigration that needs workers, particularly in blue-collar jobs, yet he estimates it has about 10 million undocumented workers. He stresses that these people are not all living off public support. Many work in cleaning, construction, and restaurants, and some pay taxes, which is why local communities have long turned a blind eye.

  • In his account, Trump tapped into the feelings of a small but intensely anti-immigrant group, making immigrants easy-to-identify “outsiders.” But Gavin recalls that actual deportations numbered only about 250,000 to 300,000. The political impact was far larger: perhaps 300,000 people were arrested, but “10 million people were afraid.”

  • Raymond shares a specific anecdote: an influential Arab-American VC executive in Silicon Valley still carries his passport when he goes out, worried that if he is arrested, nobody will be able to help him. Gavin says the fear can spread to legal residents. He describes ICE as a newly formed agency that rapidly hired many people; it is impossible for everyone to be well trained. Mistaken arrests or individual officers using excessive force can give that fear a real image.

  • Gavin says even some Republican voters who support immigration controls may reject violent enforcement or separating parents from children, so ICE has had some electoral impact. Looking ahead to the next 2 years, he expects ICE enforcement to quiet down considerably.

13. A lame duck presidency lets business owners breathe, but does not automatically shrink government

  • When the president and Congress are controlled by different parties, they not only disagree; political competition makes it hard for either side to support the other. Gavin sees this gridlock as a constraint on the president. It does not automatically undo existing government services, and it is not the smaller-government model Republicans describe: lower taxes, fewer federal services, and more responsibilities for state governments and society.

  • The entrepreneurs around him are more positive about the situation. The main thing they want is for the government not to cause trouble. Raymond points to tariffs, the trade war, and the Iran war, all of which faced little forceful opposition, and compares the atmosphere to The Emperor’s New Clothes. Now, with politicians busy fighting among themselves, businesses may feel that “we can finally sleep well.”

  • Gavin says federal politics has a major effect on foreign policy, but local and state governments often matter more to domestic business operations. If one place does not want a data center, a company can go to a nearby state or city that welcomes it. Differences between local jurisdictions mean national political conflict does not necessarily close off every path for a project.

  • He draws a clear distinction by time horizon: over the long term, this situation is definitely bad for ordinary Americans; in the short term, he thinks it is “all upside, no downside” for the economy. That is Gavin’s assessment based on what he hears from business owners, not a claim that political gridlock has no long-term costs.

14. Trump’s negotiating power is weaker, but tariffs may stay

  • On what this means for China, Gavin first points to the credibility of Trump’s commitments. With Trump weaker, he can still make commitments on the diplomatic front, but can guarantee less when it comes to carrying them out at home. Even if US-China negotiations continue, it is harder to know whether agreements will be delivered.

  • He expects US attention to turn inward over the next 2 years, with less focus on foreign policy. As a result, he leans toward thinking this may not be bad for China and could even be a little helpful, but he does not set out a specific policy shift or path to gains.

  • On whether the trade war will end, he still says “hard to say.” Gavin sees little reason for Trump to give up his own policies easily. He therefore leans toward policy staying broadly as it is, rather than interpreting Democratic control of both chambers as an end to tariffs.

15. The odds for 2028 are moving faster than the field is taking shape

  • In the Polymarket forecast Raymond cites, Vance had previously led with odds of about 35%; he also mentions Jon Ossoff and others as possible candidates. At the end of the recording, Raymond says Ossoff was up to 20% and Vance at 17%, with Ossoff’s odds doubling over the prior 24 hours. These are presidential-election market odds discussed on the show, not settled primary results.

  • Gavin’s view of Vance shifts across the discussion: at first he thinks Vance will struggle to win the primary, then puts his chance of securing the Republican nomination at “50-50,” on the grounds that he still has Trump’s support. Other Republicans will attack his record in government, but Trump’s influence remains too great to ignore. Gavin also thinks the emergence of a new figure is unlikely.

  • The Democratic field looks more like a major reshuffle, with no clear successor; Harris, AOC, and Ossoff could all try. Gavin repeatedly stresses the importance of primaries and debates: 2 years is like a century in American politics, and before the primary, even the name the market favors most may not be the eventual nominee.

16. Ossoff is drawing interest because he has shown he can win in a red state

  • Gavin explains the appeal of a “Southern Democrat”: Democrats do not have to work as hard to prove themselves in Northern strongholds like New York, but are weaker in the South. A Democrat who can win in a red Southern state can answer the most practical question in a presidential race: can he win votes that would not normally belong to his party?

  • In Gavin’s list of Ossoff’s strengths, he was born in 1987, is young, a white man, values family, and has not offended many people. He has already shown he can win in a red state, and his campaign has focused on working-class Americans and the cost of living. Those qualities explain the optimism around him, though Gavin stresses that it is still early.

  • Gavin says Ossoff did especially well in Georgia, exceeding everyone’s expectations and showing that the state could shift from red to blue. That matters to a presidential candidate because it means a better chance of winning. Raymond says the whole world will be watching Ossoff next, and refers to him on the show as “the new governor of Georgia.”

  • On Ossoff’s public statement that he is not considering a 2028 run for now, Gavin says not to take it entirely at face value. Senate candidates usually have to say they will focus on the job in front of them; talking about leaving just after winning would upset the people around them. He is bullish on Ossoff, but emphasizes that the final choice is still a long way off.