Summary

For many, Q1 GDP growth of 5.4% beat expectations, but 李丰 estimates that exports contributed about 40% of the increase, including tariff-front-running exports, while consumption contributed less than expected. Nationwide retail sales grew 4.6%; Beijing declined and Guangdong trailed the national average. Softer CPI was tied to the National Bureau of Statistics’ earlier explanation of the Lunar New Year calendar shift, with March data partly smoothing out the January-February distortion. Strong investment and front-loaded exports propped up the aggregate, but whether growth can continue after tariffs take effect ultimately depends on goods consumption.
Consumption and industry are shifting from the coast and top-tier cities toward central and western China and lower-tier markets, while population, housing and consumption structures are also changing within first-tier cities. 李丰 summarizes the trend as: “The west is growing faster than the east, and lower-tier markets faster than top-tier cities.” Coastal regions are facing both pressure on exports to the US and supply-chain relocation, while central and western China are absorbing industrial migration and overland Belt and Road trade toward Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Shanghai and Hong Kong both show the pattern of “one group leaving, then a new group moving in”: luxury homes and low-priced housing still have buyers, while mid-market restaurants have temporarily lost demand.
Hong Kong is undergoing three changes at once—demographic restructuring, stronger housing demand and a reinforced role as the offshore financing center for Chinese assets—but whether the new population actually settles there remains the key variable. By the end of 2024, Hong Kong’s resident population had recovered to near its 2019 level, with mainland buyers taking up small units and some luxury homes; talent visas could also gradually convert into education, healthcare and property demand. If Chinese companies are forced off US exchanges, 李丰 expects capital allocated to Chinese assets to concentrate more heavily in Hong Kong. That chip “may not be a chip that threatens China.”
李丰 expects there will probably be a deal between the US and China, but the timing, obstacles and non-trade terms are impossible to predict; the 90-day pause may be intended to prevent excessive volatility in the US economy, stabilize domestic sentiment and inflation, and create room for negotiations. Based on roughly $500B in China’s annual exports to the US, machinery and electronics account for about 30%—40%, with around half produced by foreign-invested factories in China; another 20%—30% has no short-term substitute. The amount that truly needs to be rerouted, restructured or sold domestically will therefore be much smaller than the headline total. “If you don’t buy my product, you can’t buy a substitute” is the hardest answer companies have to the tariff shock.
Even in a relatively bearish case, redirecting roughly $100B of export value into the domestic market could translate into about RMB1.5T of end-demand, requiring retail-sales growth to rise from the low-4% range to roughly 7%—9%. Policy therefore cannot stop at subsidizing a handful of big-ticket items and “chain leaders”; it must broaden category coverage and improve employment and consumption expectations among younger people. 李丰 sees employment, subsidy coverage and expectations as critical, while the property and stock markets concern the repair of household balance sheets. In the latest policy sequencing, the fact that “stocks come before housing” is worth watching.
Recent abnormal moves in US assets look more like global pools of capital cutting exposure because of policy uncertainty than an imminent collapse in Treasuries or the dollar. “I bought you for certainty” (“我本来买你就是为了确定”): once tariff policy moved from A to B to C, Treasuries, US equities and passive products all lost their former predictability, leaving large dollar pools with only limited-capacity destinations such as gold, Europe and Asia. Gold has therefore been temporarily negatively correlated with US policy uncertainty; if a deal restores predictability, some capital will rotate back into standard dollar assets.
The US exports most likely to increase under a trade deal are energy rather than agricultural products, but China would have to pay a higher price for that bargaining chip. Agricultural exports are currently a little above $20B; even doubling them would run into limits from Chinese demand and US supply. Energy is the category in which both sides have flexibility, but US shale oil and gas may lose money below roughly $60, while prices above $75 risk lifting inflation. 李丰 estimates that if China buys an additional $100B of US energy, it could still pay more than $10B extra even after a 10% import tariff.
If countries ultimately retain pronounced tariff tiers, global supply chains may split into a “US-only” track and a “China-for-the-rest-of-the-world” track. Apple is already supplying the US with iPhones made in India and other markets with iPhones made in China; Tesla likewise uses US factories for the domestic market and Chinese factories for China and much of the world outside the US. The US may regain some manufacturing but lose the world’s best value-for-money products. Whether domestic demand can absorb exports, Hong Kong can take in offshore capital and companies can build irreplaceable products are the three recurring themes of this upheaval.

Deep dive

1. Strong 5.4% growth, but consumption is not pulling its weight

李翔 said Q1 GDP growth of 5.4% beat expectations for many people. 李丰’s response was “not bad,” because although several data points surprised on the upside, exports contributed about 40% of the increase, and tariff-front-running exports cannot be treated as a sustainable growth driver.
The decline in CPI was related to the National Bureau of Statistics’ earlier explanation of the February data: the Lunar New Year calendar shift made January and February look weak, while the trend formed in March partly erased that distortion.
Nationwide retail sales grew 4.6% in Q1. The figure itself beat expectations, but consumption’s contribution to economic growth was still below what 李丰 had originally expected. Beijing’s retail sales declined, while Guangdong also failed to reach the national average, making the geographic sources of aggregate growth an important question.
李丰’s breakdown is straightforward: investment was relatively strong, the Lunar New Year should have supported some goods consumption, and front-loaded exports provided an additional lift in Q1. Strip out investment and exports, and goods consumption still needs more policy support.

2. Consumption growth is shifting from the coast and top-tier cities to central and western China and lower-tier markets

李丰 reiterated an earlier observation: “The west is growing faster than the east, and lower-tier markets faster than top-tier cities.” The limited comparison between Beijing, Guangdong and the national average does not, at minimum, contradict that trend.
His causal chain is that coastal regions absorb more exports to the US while also bearing the pressure of supply chains moving to Southeast Asia. Some industries are relocating inland to central and western China, creating new sources of local income and consumption growth.
Central and western China are also benefiting from overland transport and Belt and Road trade. Goods flow not only toward Southeast Asia but increasingly toward Central Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. Traditional developed regions therefore face short-term transition pain, while regions once considered less developed are less exposed to the same external shock.

3. Hong Kong and Shanghai are both being repriced by a “one group leaves, another replaces it” population cycle

李丰 placed Hong Kong and Shanghai in the same framework: from 2022 to 2024, both lost some foreign nationals and affluent residents, then brought in younger people through talent schemes, relaxed residency rules and similar measures—“one group left, then a new group moved in.”
After the removal of housing curbs, Hong Kong’s property market briefly revived. Following more than 3 years of declines, mainland buyers were indeed a major source of demand from the end of 2024 into 2025, purchasing both smaller, livable units and some luxury homes sold by wealthy residents leaving Hong Kong.
Hong Kong’s resident population had recovered by the end of 2024 to near its 2019 level, but its composition had changed. Better cross-border infrastructure has increased weekend trips to Guangzhou and Shenzhen, while local dining has begun shifting from older, Western-style formats toward younger and more hybrid concepts. Mainland chains are arriving with the new customer base.
Shanghai’s registered population increased by about 80,000 in 2024. In the second-hand market, homes below RMB6M and historic villas were relatively active at opposite ends of the spectrum, but that did not necessarily lift average prices. 李丰 speculated that the average age of new residents may be falling, as may average income, bringing a corresponding reshuffling of consumption.

4. The “disappearing middle” in first-tier cities looks more like a gear shift than a permanent vacuum

李翔’s concern is that demand remains at both ends: affluent consumers continue to buy historic villas, luxury homes and high-priced services, while sub-RMB6M housing and value-for-money chain restaurants still have demand. What has diminished is the white-collar and finance workforce that once supported restaurants charging RMB200—300 per person, or even RMB300—400. “The middle layer has been hollowed out.”
李丰 acknowledged that the consumption ladder has thinned in the short term, but rejected the idea of permanent hollowing-out. He defines the medium term as 1—3 years: after new residents settle and buy homes, their lives will gradually return to the typical trajectory of people around 30 in a city, and new dining and service supply will follow the newcomers.
Foreign consumption illustrates another kind of replacement. Shanghai, along with parts of Beijing, has seen a clear increase in foreigners, but they are more often short-term tourists and transit passengers rather than long-term employees of multinationals. After instant tax refunds were introduced, taxi drivers observed visitors leaving with “bags and bags” of purchases; 李翔 joked that this was “human Alibaba.”

5. Hong Kong residency is a 10-plus-year decision, not something to price off one year’s anxiety

李翔 cautioned that people from mainland China who obtain Hong Kong residency through talent schemes may not actually live there. Some do it mainly to obtain entry and exit records, while local tax and income requirements for renewal are obstacles that many applicants did not fully consider at the outset.
李丰’s progression is: first attract capable and socially prominent people to establish a connection; then let work, company formation or projects extend into children’s education and parents’ healthcare. Only when those plans are about to materialize does the probability of buying property and living locally rise.
李丰 relayed a controversial view from one participant: looking back from the mid-1990s onward, decisions to leave China that seemed rational in the short term were not necessarily the better choice for business or personal development 10—15 years later. 李丰 broadly agreed, while stressing that the premise is continued openness in China.
李丰 also relayed another friend’s view: “As long as China stays open, these people will come back,” and may even continue participating in China’s economy while holding US or Singaporean citizenship. He cited the early return of 李革 and 尹志尧’s renunciation of US citizenship to make the point that the truly irrecoverable loss is time spent missing a golden industrial cycle.

6. The core of corporate identity is matching long-term structure with short-term purpose

李丰 compared immigration with buying stocks: many people say they are bullish for 5—10 years but sell after a 6-month drawdown. Likewise, making a 10—15-year identity decision to solve a 1-year problem is fundamentally a duration mismatch. If the objective is clearly a child’s education or retirement, a long-term choice is entirely reasonable.
李翔 noted that an entrepreneur’s nationality did not always trigger strong public emotion, but people have become unusually sensitive over the past 2 years. 李丰 sees two reasons: US-China tensions amplify the significance of particular nationalities, and changing identity while a company is under supply-chain pressure invites a new interpretation of the decision.
One type of maneuver 李丰 criticized is relying on China’s supply chain to grow, then moving the company to a third country and rapidly changing identity under tariff pressure before claiming not to be a Chinese company. Overseas markets will still see a Chinese supply chain, while China will see the company as having abandoned its roots. The result is “pleasing nobody on any of the three sides.”
李翔 asked whether a relatively heavy exit tax could reduce the moral dispute. He then said that instead of repeatedly changing identity, companies should adopt TikTok-style consistency: “I am a Chinese company.” If the US demands compliance, build a US structure, store data locally or bring in US shareholders—but do not use identity changes to solve a political problem.

7. A “second opening” in services is reopening the road for private capital

The State Council has proposed raising the opening level of free-trade zones and expanding pilot openings in services, including finance, healthcare and internet licenses and business scopes. 李丰 sees 3 recent capital-market cases as more concrete signals than policy documents.
QuantGroup and Webull were both private internet-finance companies that began around 2014. After more than 10 years of regulatory cycles, the former filed for a Hong Kong listing and the latter began trading on Nasdaq through a SPAC. Since overseas listings require approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission, receiving that “road permit” at minimum implies regulatory acquiescence or recognition.
BenQ Group, which also received approval to list in Hong Kong that month, was explicitly defined as a for-profit private hospital group. 李丰 used the case to reiterate a long-running observation: once a Chinese industry has completed the first cycle of “open it and it becomes chaotic, regulate it and it dies” and established governance rules, a second opening to foreign capital usually also means reopening to private domestic capital.

8. If Chinese stocks are forced off US exchanges, Hong Kong could absorb more offshore assets

The US Treasury secretary has raised the possibility of removing all Chinese stocks from US exchanges. 李丰 considers that a worst-case scenario that may not happen. Companies such as Bilibili already have dual primary listings in the US and Hong Kong, while Alibaba and others have increased Hong Kong’s role; the migration is not unprepared.
李丰 is explicit about Hong Kong’s role: “the offshore financing window for Chinese assets” and an offshore trading center. Offshore RMB quotas, RMB bond issuance and listings by Chinese companies are reinforcing that position.
If international capital still needs an environment free of mainland capital controls in which to allocate to Chinese assets, and the US channel closes, it will have almost nowhere to go but Hong Kong. That chip “may not be a chip that threatens China”; it could instead weaken New York’s medium-term competitiveness as a global financial center.

9. The 90-day pause is a negotiation window, but Washington still lacks a stable script

李丰 did not claim to know how the tariff story ends. His personal guess is only that “there will probably be a deal.” What remains impossible to judge is how the deal comes about, what the obstacles are and how long it will take.
The 90-day pause may serve 3 purposes simultaneously: preventing excessive volatility in the US economy, stabilizing domestic sentiment and inflation, pressuring other countries to reach arrangements first, and creating room to find some form of US-China trade terms by the end of June. 李丰 repeatedly stressed that this is only an inference based on what seems rational.
The US first exempted some goods, then continued raising tariffs; first said China would negotiate, then said it was waiting for China to come to the table. 李丰 speculated that during the week when both sides pushed retaliation to the limit, decision-makers internally “didn’t know, or weren’t sure, what would happen,” leaving public messaging out of control.
On the night before recording, Trump said again that he was no longer threatening to remove Powell, wanted the Fed to cut rates, and believed tariffs on China were too high and would eventually be reduced substantially. These remarks gave markets a little certainty, but also showed that policy itself had become a source of volatility.

10. Treasuries will not collapse immediately; gold is first reflecting a scarcity of certainty

On the popular claim that $6T of Treasuries will mature in a concentrated wave at the end of June, 李丰 said the framing is inaccurate: the debt will not all be rolled over in one lump at the same moment. Even if China would like to see the US come under pressure, Treasuries are unlikely to collapse in this cycle because they remain the pricing anchor for risk assets.
The US has issued too many dollars over the past 20 years, especially the past 5. Large funds, sovereign wealth funds and governments also cannot put all that capital into individual stocks. Their main options are Treasuries, sovereign bonds, passive products, regional assets and gold.
Tariff policy suddenly made the US economy, the international environment and asset returns unpredictable. The logic of large pools of capital became: “I bought you for certainty” (“我本来买你就是为了确定”). Once that certainty disappeared, they had to cut exposure to US equities, Treasuries and other US assets.
The capital pools are too large and the destinations available after exit are too limited, so gold, Europe, Japan and South Korea, emerging markets and Chinese assets may all receive part of the allocation. If US policy stabilizes, capital will return to standard instruments and gold may fall. China’s government buying gold also reflects a separate need for an underlying anchor for RMB internationalization.

11. Of the $500B in exports to the US, the portion requiring restructuring or domestic sale is smaller than the headline total

李丰 broke down China’s roughly $500B in annual exports to the US. Machinery and electronics with medium-to-high value added account for about 30%—40%, including laptops and smartphones; around 50% are made by foreign-invested factories in China, so tariffs are not being imposed entirely on Chinese companies.
These products rely on China’s complete supply chain and precision-processing capabilities, while the US has few short-term substitutes. Employment will still be affected, but the interests of foreign companies and US demand itself make this more than $100B of products more likely to receive differentiated treatment.
Of the remaining goods, 李丰 estimates that another 20%—30% is difficult to replace because of resource characteristics, complex supply chains or technical capabilities. Whether they receive full exemptions is uncertain, but market forces will push tariff design toward different tiers.

12. The most effective tariff hedge is making new products that customers can buy only from you

A Kunshan-based stroller company ranked first globally used to have new products account for about 20% of its annual US sales. After tariffs, it raised the launch rate to above 40% and added smartphone-controlled rocking frequency, sensors, connectivity and automated controls.
李丰 kept the example because no individual feature is necessarily the hardest part. The challenge is integrating smart functions, a complex stroller supply chain and consistent manufacturing into a product that “China really is the only country able to make well.” If US consumers need those functions, substitutes are scarce.
Insta360 offered an even more direct answer: when the US is a large share of the market, the best response is to build “unique irreplaceability” into the product—“If you don’t buy my product, you can’t buy a substitute” (“除了买我的产品，你买不到替代品”). 李丰 sees GoPro as pursuing a similar strategy. Robot vacuums, snow blowers and pool-cleaning equipment follow the same path.

13. A tax gap above 20% may create transshipment, but third countries will not choose only the US

李丰 expects some components to be shipped first to a third country, where additional processing and assembly would be completed before re-export. The US will investigate aggressively, while China has explicitly warned that third countries joining efforts against China under coercion will face reciprocal retaliation.
李翔 added that the US and Chinese consumer markets are already close to joint first place, with a gap of less than 10%; China offers relatively more certainty. It does not make sense for a third country to abandon the world’s second-largest market for the world’s largest market when the latter’s policies are unpredictable.
As long as the US tariff gap between China and a third country remains above 20%, especially above 25%, 李丰 expects transshipment to occur to some degree because “the money is too easy.” Direct trade reported between China and the US may decline, while the underlying supply-chain relationship survives in another form.

14. Reworking goods value and services trade will continue shrinking the merchandise base subject to tariffs

李丰 used a $10 teacup as an illustration: export the lid and glass separately as components, making the combined merchandise value $3.50, while the remaining $6.50 is paid by the US importer as product-design fees. The latter falls under services trade rather than the merchandise tariff base.
He stressed that the figures were illustrative and compared the structure with joint-venture automobiles: the brand-licensing fees on each Volkswagen or BMW sold in China can be remitted to headquarters as services trade. The RMB40K and RMB100K examples used on the program were also explicitly not actual fee rates; they were only meant to explain the structure.
The same logic applies to a hypothetical Google Europe business. If local revenue is $50B, headquarters could extract most of the profit through software and technology licensing fees, while tax authorities would struggle to determine whether the internal pricing was reasonable. US companies, especially software companies, have used similar structures extensively; Chinese companies have historically used them on a much smaller scale.

15. Redirecting $100B of exports into domestic sales could push the retail-sales target to 7%—9%

After exemptions, irreplaceable products, transshipment and services-trade restructuring, 李丰 assumes that $100B of merchandise value still has to be absorbed domestically. If exports are priced near cost, turning them into end products would require roughly $200B of sales, or about RMB1.5T.
If the pressure doubles, end-demand could approach RMB3T. China’s annual consumer-goods market is more than RMB40T. With retail sales growing only in the low-4% range and generating a natural annual increment of more than RMB2T, absorbing an additional RMB1T-plus could require growth to rise to 7%—9%.
Whether the illustrative structure is “the state contributes RMB500B and households RMB1T” or “the state contributes RMB700B and households RMB800B,” policy must create real purchasing power on top of the existing increment. 李丰 considers RMB1.5T a bearish but not extreme mid-range estimate.

16. The only US exports that can increase substantially to China are energy, and the bargaining chip is not cheap

The US has complained that China did not fully honor agricultural purchase commitments during the first trade war, but current agricultural exports are only a little above $20B. China’s use of soybeans and corn, as well as the US’s ability to expand production within 1 year, have limits; doubling the figure would already be close to an extreme case.
李丰 believes energy is the only category in which both sides have meaningful flexibility. US shale oil and gas may lose money below roughly $60, while prices above $75 would create inflation, leaving policymakers with a narrow operating range.
China’s energy sources are diversified and its average import cost is relatively low. US energy is more expensive because of extraction, transportation and required margins. If China buys an additional $100B, 李丰 estimates that even after deducting a 10% import tariff, China could still pay more than $10B extra. The question is simply whether it is willing to pay that cost for a deal.

17. Tariff tiers could split global manufacturing into a “US lane” and a “global lane”

Apple has already demonstrated the model: iPhones made in India serve the US, while iPhones made in China serve markets outside the US. Because Chinese products have better yields and lower costs, Apple can only choose between US profits and profits elsewhere.
Tesla uses a similar structure: US factories primarily serve the domestic market, while Chinese factories serve China and export extensively to markets outside the US. Shanghai capacity was previously tight precisely because one factory was serving both the largest single market and the rest of the world.
If tariffs ultimately form clear tiers, companies are likely to place US-only capacity in countries with lower tariff rates while reserving China and other high-efficiency supply chains for the rest of the world. Chinese companies will also expand into multiple countries rather than putting all their overseas bets on Vietnam or Thailand.
李丰’s medium-term conclusion is that this may not benefit the US. Manufacturing could partly return, but US consumers would no longer get the best value-for-money products available globally. Even setting aside worker capabilities, supplier responsiveness and market capacity, reshoring is more likely to produce isolated capacity that “serves the US only.”

18. Musk’s political expansion is now feeding back against Tesla’s commercial gains

李丰 recalled that Tesla first changed the auto industry and AI, then influenced the US election, after which Musk entered the government. When he tried to change the world through politics rather than industry, “the institution became so large that it turned around and consumed him.”
After the US launched the tariff war, overseas anger toward the US and dissatisfaction with Musk’s political role compounded on the brand. The program observed that he has clearly receded from government coverage and may soon leave the so-called Department of Government Efficiency, but it is impossible to know how long the damage from the past 4 months will take to repair.
Tesla is already using zero-interest and interest-free installment promotions in China; it is no longer outside the price war. 李翔 also cited an interview saying Musk’s interest in cars and new models may have declined. Musk had not been bullish on the Model Y, yet it later became the world’s best-selling model, teaching executives that “the boss is not necessarily always right.”

19. MAGA may be rebuilding America around the youthful memories of a 79-year-old

李丰 repeatedly qualified this as “pure personal speculation”: Trump is 79 this year and belongs to the first group of baby boomers born after World War II. Until roughly age 40, he lived through 1945—1985, when the US was extraordinarily strong in manufacturing, military power, the dollar and global influence.
In his formative memory, the US moved from surplus to deficit but still defeated the Soviet Union and overcame oil and financial crises. Manufacturing relocation, financial globalization and the second wave of globalization occurred mostly after he turned 40. MAGA may therefore mean restoring the order of his young-adult years.
李翔’s qualification is worth retaining: that history may be idealized, and nostalgia for a national golden age may be mixed with nostalgia for one’s own youth and physical vigor. 李丰 countered with Buffett and Munger, who continued learning late in life, arguing that someone who stops learning while holding enormous power is most likely to turn old experience into a policy target.
If this psychological reading is correct, Trump would indeed need a deal—but also one that matches the “posture America should have” in his memory. The interpretation may explain his objective, but it cannot predict the terms of the negotiation.

20. Six years of preparation and a series of emotional steps changed the relative positions in the negotiation

Foreign media had repeatedly asked in March whether the US and Chinese leaders might meet in April, showing that basic communication had already been in place. 李丰 speculated that the US initially assumed China would accept its deal structure after tariffs were announced, then used unexpectedly high rates to apply pressure when talks failed.
李丰 even said, “Fortunately, Trump had a term out of office in between”: from the first trade war in 2018 to today, China had roughly 6 years to prepare supply chains, retaliation tools and policy drills, enabling it to respond in kind within 1.5 days of this round of tariff announcements.
China’s top leader visited Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia, while other members of the Politburo traveled to different parts of the country for research. 李丰 interpreted this as stabilizing trade ties with key neighbors externally, breaking the domestic response into tasks across the east, west, north and south, and restarting infrastructure cooperation in roads, bridges and water projects.
Domestic sentiment was not shifted by tariffs alone. From the 9/24 policy package, stock-market gains, trade-in subsidies and front-loaded exports to DeepSeek, Ne Zha, the private-enterprise symposium and tariff retaliation, events “stepped on one another, one step after another.” The external impression therefore became that the US wanted a deal more urgently, while China had at least not shown signs of being the first to buckle.

21. The real constraint on domestic demand is not a lack of money, but employment, balance sheets and expectations

李丰 inferred from the sudden increase in collection messages after the Lunar New Year that some consumer loans and small private loans may have been originated 7—8 months earlier and recently become delinquent. This is not a formal statistic, but it suggests that economic pressure was real from the middle to the end of last year and cannot be said to have disappeared.
Services consumption was reasonably solid in Q1; the main problem was goods consumption. Some big-ticket demand in Beijing may have been pulled forward by subsidies in Q4 last year, while the Lunar New Year is not the strongest setting for goods consumption. The economy must still contend with the fading of front-loaded exports and the additional domestic-sales pressure created by tariffs.
Since last September, policy has placed increasing emphasis on expectations rather than immediate stimulus alone. China has about RMB40T in excess savings, showing that spending capacity has not disappeared. The core reason households “do not dare to spend” remains their balance sheet, cash flow and judgment about future employment income.
李丰’s policy priorities are to broaden subsidy categories and coverage, stabilize employment for younger people and continue improving expectations, while monitoring how the stock and property markets affect household balance sheets. In this round, “stocks come before housing” because the capital market can better support economic restructuring. He also disclosed that since investing in funds last year, his dollar holdings were up more than 40% and his RMB holdings about 22%—23%, for a combined gain of roughly 30%.

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